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This dissertation examines the regional economic effects of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). FDI is known to have benefits for both national and regional 
economies. These benefits include an increasing number of higher paying jobs, 
productivity spillovers for local firms, and elevated economic development (SelectUSA, 
2020). Many governments compete to attract large FDI projects, often through the use of 
controversial incentive packages. Incentives are criticized because it is not clear that they 
affect the location of FDI and furthermore, whether the benefit of incentives outweigh the 
costs (Bartik, 2018).  
In the first paper, I assess the impact of incentives on the location of 
manufacturing FDI within the United States relative to other fundamental determinants. I 
find that agglomeration economies are among the most significant location factors. 
Localization economies have an elasticity of 0.92 while urbanization economies have an 
elasticity of 1.31. Additionally, I find that the corporate income tax rate has an elasticity 
of -0.46 while the investment tax credit has an elasticity of 1.56. In the second paper, I 
test the influence of culture and FDI in Eastern Europe. Culture has long been recognized 
as an important determinant of business location decisions; however, culture is difficult 
to disentangle from other factors (Beugelsdijk et al., 2011). In this paper I measure 
culture through a historical affiliation with the Habsburg Empire. This allows me to 
employ a regression discontinuity design to explore the effect of culture on the spatial 
allocation of FDI along the historical empire border. As no other characteristic impacting 
v 
FDI changes along the border, any observed differences in FDI are interpreted as causal 
effects of cultural ties on the location of FDI. The results suggest that there are between 
0.24 and 0.32 additional investments per 10,000 individuals coming from Habsburg-
affiliated countries in the former empire territories of Romania and Serbia today.  
In the last paper, I examine the effect of FDI in rural counties in the United States. 
Using a combination of quasi-experimental techniques, I determine the effect of FDI on 
personal income and employment growth. I find limited evidence on the efficacy of 
targeting FDI for economic development. 
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INCENTIVES AND THE LOCATION OF FOREIGN 
MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
Section 1.1: Introduction 
 
Revitalizing U.S. manufacturing remains a paramount policy goal for national and 
regional economic development. The outsourcing of manufacturing investment and rising 
import penetration are ongoing concerns, with scholarly research uncovering adverse 
impacts across U.S. regions (Autor et al., 2016). In contrast, inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) augments factory employment and the U.S. manufacturing capital 
stock. The United States consistently attracts large FDI inflows. Among the industry 
sectors that receive investment, manufacturing attracts the highest share of inward FDI. 
In 2018, the stock of manufacturing FDI reached 1.8 trillion dollars, comprising more 
than 40 percent of total foreign direct investment in the United States (OFII, 2018). This 
trend is expected to continue, as manufacturing FDI continually experiences one of the 
highest growth rates of any sector at 9 percent per year (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
2017).  
Policy makers promote favorable tax breaks and incentives to steer new 
investment to particular regions. This paper examines the effect of these policies on 
greenfield FDI in manufacturing. New, or greenfield plant investment, requires an 
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explicit location choice, while other types of FDI such as mergers and acquisitions have 
no new location decision. Regional policy makers target greenfield FDI because of 
perceived benefits for the host economy, notably the prospect of boosting high-wage 
employment.  A recent study finds that wages for foreign enterprises are 25 percent 
higher than average wages for domestic firms, controlling for industry and location 
(Setzler and Tintelnot, 2019). This same study suggests that the wage premium generated 
may even justify or outweigh the incentive received. 
Given the controversy over incentives, it is important to understand the effect that 
incentives have on the location decisions of firms. States and localities compete fiercely 
with each other, attempting to draw in new investment and expand the employment base 
(Zhuang, 2016). In the regional development literature, incentives are generally seen as 
distorting market decisions and are largely considered to be wasteful (Bartik, 2017). Yet, 
regional development incentives in the United States show no signs of abating. Business 
incentives almost tripled nationwide from 1990 to 2015. In some states, incentives are 
restricted to manufacturing. Moreover, incentives are typically larger for manufacturing 
than for other sectors (Bartik, 2017).   
This paper investigates how incentives compare with fundamental location 
determinants of manufacturing like agglomeration economies. In the United States, the 
Midwest/Great Lakes and Southeast regions dominate manufacturing agglomeration. 
Accordingly, I focus on the U.S. regions where there is the greatest intensity of 
manufacturing agglomeration and fierce incentive competition among states. According 
to the Institute for Competitiveness (2018), in 2015 Indiana had the highest share of 
manufacturing employment (17.6 percent), followed by Wisconsin and Michigan. In the 
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Southeast, Alabama leads as the state with the highest share of manufacturing 
employment (13.6 percent), followed by Kentucky and South Carolina. I test both state 
and county-level location determinants within the primary manufacturing regions of the 
United States: the traditional “industrial heartland" agglomeration in the Midwest and the 
ascending manufacturing agglomeration in the South.  
This research uses two unique databases to identify FDI in manufacturing and 
regional incentives: fDi Markets and the Bartik Panel Database. fDi Markets, a database 
maintained by the Financial Times, tracks cross-border greenfield investment. It 
identifies the specific location of foreign investment by industry.  The Bartik panel 
database captures specific regional incentives and tax breaks offered to manufacturing 
firms (Bartik, 2017). 
Based on these databases, this study is the first to isolate the importance of 
incentives relative to agglomeration and other fundamental location factors in drawing 
firms to locate in a particular state. I estimate a panel Poisson specification with random 
effects to model the state and county-level determinants of foreign manufacturing 
investment in the Southeast and Midwestern United States. 
The results suggest that agglomeration economies are among the most significant 
factors in the manufacturing location decision. Specifically, urban agglomeration 
economies as captured by the wage premium, have an elasticity of 1.32 percent. Local 
industry agglomeration (localization), as modeled by the number of domestic 
manufacturing establishments have an elasticity of 0.92 percent. Secondly, state taxes and 
incentives can matter.  Among the taxes and incentives considered in this model, I find 
that the corporate income tax and the investment tax credit have the biggest potential 
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influence on the location decision. A one percent increase in the corporate income tax 
rate as a percentage of the value-added decreases the expected number of FDI projects by 
0.46 percent while a one percent increase in the investment tax credit as a percentage of 
the value added increases the expected number of FDI projects by 1.56 percent. Other 
taxes and incentives considered, which have no measurable effect on the location 
decision of firms, are the sales and property tax, the job creation and research and 
development tax credit, and the customized job training subsidy. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 1.2 reviews 
the agglomeration and recent economic development incentive literature. In Section 1.3 I 
explain the Poisson regression model, while section 1.4 describes the data that underlie 
the model's estimates. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 put forth the state and county hypotheses that 
are tested in the model and Section 1.7 presents the results. Section 1.8 introduces some 
possible extensions of the model. Finally, Section 1.9 concludes. 
 
Section 1.2: Literature Review 
 
Foreign manufacturing firms continually invest in the U.S. because the country 
offers a large, integrated, relatively stable, safe, and growing market. In making their 
plant location decision, firms must then choose specific sites within broad U.S. regions 
that offer varying competitive advantages for profitable production. That is, location 
decision makers often concentrate on choices within particular U.S. regions, not the 
nation as a whole. Within specific regions, firms and their site selection consultants 
screen for profit-maximizing local characteristics such as agglomeration and 
development incentives (Woodward, 2012). Often, agglomeration is fundamental in the 
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location decision of firms, as has been extensively studied and confirmed in the regional 
science literature. 
 
Section 1.2.1: Agglomeration 
 
Agglomeration refers to the spatial concentration of firms and workers beyond 
what would be expected in a given area. It is expected that regions with high industry 
agglomeration will benefit from positive externalities of being in close proximity to other 
firms and workers. Research across many different fields, including labor economics, 
industrial organization, international business, and economic history have shown that 
industrial clusters raise worker productivity.  Additional positive externalities include 
increasing returns to scale which allow firms and workers to generate more output with 
the same amount of inputs in larger, denser regions. These benefits of agglomeration 
typically offset the cost of congestion, pollution, and other negative externalities that may 
occur through regional agglomeration (Henderson, 1974). The literature defines 
agglomeration in two ways, industry localization and urbanization economies. 
 
Section 1.2.1.1: Establishment and Localization Economies 
 
Localization economies refer to positive spillovers that a firm can benefit from by 
locating within a cluster of local business establishments in a particular industry. Most of 
the previous studies find positive and significant effects of localization economies on the 
location decision.  
In an early study examining the determinants of manufacturing FDI, Coughlin et 
al. (1991) find that the primary force driving the location decisions of FDI is 
agglomeration as captured by the manufacturing density in a given state. Later studies 
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examining Japanese FDI confirm these findings. Woodward (1992) implements a 
conditional logit model to estimate the probability of site selection at both the state and 
county level, using data from the Japan Economic Institute. Once a particular state is 
chosen, it is evident that Japanese investors are drawn by existing manufacturing 
agglomerations as well as highly educated and productive workers. Using the same 
database Head et al. (1995) examine the location decisions of Japanese manufacturing 
firms in the United States. They pay special attention to the effect of agglomeration 
economies on the location decision. They test several agglomeration variables including 
local manufacturing clusters of domestic and Japanese establishments as well as clusters 
of manufacturing establishments in bordering states. They find that a 10 percent increase 
in any of the agglomeration variables tested increases the probability of Japanese 
investment by 5 to 7 percent, even after controlling for state specific effects, state time 
trends, and industry-level stocks and flows of domestic investment. However, their 
results also show that for Japanese investors, an agglomeration of Japanese 
manufacturing activity outweighs the importance of domestic manufacturing 
agglomeration. In another study of Japanese manufacturing location decisions, Smith and 
Florida (1994) test the impact of several measures of agglomeration along with other 
location characteristics. They explore the idea that many Japanese investors cluster in 
certain areas to take advantage of “just-in-time" production, a business practice aimed at 
promoting efficiencies related to transportation costs. To accomplish this goal, the 
authors test the effect of distance to the nearest Japanese automotive assembly plant, as 
well as the number of “Big Three" domestic automotive assemblers within 250 miles of a 
given county. As in previous research, they also test the manufacturing density as 
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measured by the percentage of a county's labor force employed in manufacturing. They 
find strong evidence of the importance of agglomeration economies across all models 
tested. Other studies that examine FDI from all countries in the United States find similar 
effects. Zhuang (2014) and Zhuang (2016) examine the location decisions of greenfield 
FDI. Zhuang (2014) analyzes the location decisions of foreign manufacturers at the state 
level. He finds that manufacturing FDI is attracted to areas with a higher density of 
manufacturing establishments. Zhuang (2016) analyzes the location decisions of all 
greenfield FDI at the MSA level. The results also suggest that new investment is attracted 
to areas with a high share of manufacturing and service activity.   
The importance of agglomeration is also documented in other types of location 
studies. In a study examining why headquarters move, Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) 
find that an agglomeration of headquarters in the same industry have a significant effect 
on the probability of relocating a firm's headquarters in every specification tested. A ten 
percent increase in the number of headquarters in the same industry increases the 
probability of choosing a location by 6.7 percent. These are just several examples of the 
many instances of the importance of localization economies in previous research. Even 
more supportive evidence of this can be found in studies including Luger and Shetty 
(1985), Friedman et al., (1992), Guimaraes et al., (2000), List (2001), and Gabe and Bell 
(2004). While localization consistently stands out as a contributing factor in drawing new 
investment, urbanization economies are perhaps even more important in the location 
decisions of firms (Arauzo-Carod et al., 2010). 






Section 1.2.1.2: Urbanization Economies 
 
Urbanization economies refer to the more general spillovers that firms can benefit 
from that are generated through the interaction of various industries and clusters within a 
given region. It is noted by previous studies that firms also receive benefits from urban 
agglomeration, or the activities of a diverse set of firms and services that occur in an area 
that may not necessarily be related to a specific industry (Arauzo-Carod et al., 2010). One 
of the ways in which this is demonstrated is through the urban wage premium. 
Areas with higher wages may reflect the positive spillover effects of urban 
agglomeration. Notably, researchers consistently discover that urban wages reflect higher 
productivity (Yankow, 2006). The urban wage premium could also stem from the 
selection of workers into areas based on their abilities and career choices (Gould, 2007). 
The higher skills and productivity of workers are embodied in higher regional average 
wages. Studies show that at the firm level, foreign firms typically pay higher wages than 
domestic firms (Doms and Jensen, 1998, Feliciano and Lipsey, 1999, Setzler and 
Tintelnot, 2019). Setzler and Tintelnot (2019) show that most of this premium can be 
attributed to higher worker skill. However, they also find that there is no discernible 
difference in wage premiums between foreign firms and domestic multinational firms 
suggesting that the wage premium can also be explained by the higher productivity of 
such firms as well as the “tangible and intangible foreign inputs" these firms may have 
access to. 
In empirical studies, the effect of wages on the location decisions of firms is 
mixed. Some older studies consistently find that wages have a negative effect on the 
location decisions of firms (Luger and Shetty, 1985, Coughlin et al., 1991, Friedman et 
 
9 
al., 1992, Luker, 1998, Coughlin and Segev, 2000, List and Mchone, 2000, List, 2001, 
Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009). However, some studies find a positive and significant 
effect of wages on the location decision of firms.  Smith and Florida (1994) perform a 
county level analysis of the determinants of Japanese manufacturing investment in the 
United States. Using a measure of the average annual wage for production workers in the 
manufacturing industry, they find a positive and significant effect of wages across all 
models considered. In this study, the authors did not expect to find a negative effect of 
wages on the location decisions of firms because they note that Japanese firms typically 
offer high wages to ensure labor force stability and to develop higher levels of human 
capital.  Head et al. (1999) examine Japanese manufacturing investment in the United 
States from 1980-1992. They use a measure of the average state manufacturing wage. In 
their base specification, the effect of wages is negative and insignificant. Once they 
control for agglomeration, wages become positive and statistically significant. The 
authors state that these results could reflect the variation in the skill composition of the 
work force.  Guimaraes et al. (2000) examine the location decisions of foreign firms in 
Portugal. Using an index of manufacturing wage rates in Portugal, the authors find a 
positive effect of wages on location decisions of firms. In some specifications of the 
model, the results are significant. The authors suggest that these results could be 
explained by the fact that higher wages may not deter investors at the local level, rather 
they would deter investors at the country level.  Zhuang (2014) and Zhuang (2016) find 
that higher wages across U.S. states appear to have a positive effect on attracting FDI. He 
finds that higher wages increase FDI, while standard measures of agglomeration also 
matter for manufacturing. Clearly, the most consistent factor found to influence FDI 
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location is agglomeration. This paper aims to not only confirm these findings but more 
importantly to test the relative importance of agglomeration in comparison to local 
incentives offered, the effect of which has yet to be determined. 
 
Section 1.2.2: Development Incentives and Taxation 
 
Are firms influenced by incentives, or would they locate in a particular area 
regardless of the incentives offered? Incentives are frequently offered because they are 
believed to enhance economic development outcomes. If incentives are successful in 
attracting firms, they may expand local jobs and raise wages, as well as increase the tax 
revenue for the community. However, these local economic benefits must be weighed 
against the cost of incentives and the possibility that they will diminish spending on state 
and local government services. Additionally, there is the risk that the firms will not 
deliver on promises for the employment and investment, as exemplified by the infamous 
Taiwan-based Foxconn flat panel investment in Wisconsin (Bartik, 2018). While there 
has been some research on the effect of incentives and taxation on the location decision 
of firms, their effects are not well established in the FDI literature. 
As summarized by Peters and Fisher (2004), early studies conducted before 1980 
found that incentives had at best a marginal impact on the firm location decision and did 
not significantly alter the spatial distribution of firms. Over time, with improvements in 
econometric modeling, researchers are now better able to model the influence of taxes 
and incentives on location. More recent studies conclude that taxes and incentives, may 
affect regional and local economic growth. The taxes considered in past studies are per 
capita property taxes (Guimaraes et al., 2004), as well as other measures including state 
and local income tax, unemployment tax, severance taxes, and business fees and licenses 
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(McConnell and Schwab, 1990). Generally, these studies find that higher levels of 
taxation have a negative effect on the locational probability of investment. Some studies 
assess incentives through other measures such as subsidies offered (Head et al., 1999) or 
state promotion expenditures (Coughlin et al., 1991). Some researchers construct indices 
that attempt to measure state “effort” by combining measures of job training subsidies, 
business climate indicators, and expenditures on investment attraction and retention 
(Luger and Shetty, 1985). 
Recent research examines the impact of particular policies such as the 
Empowerment Zone Program (Hanson and Rohlin, 2011) and the New Markets Tax 
Credit Program (Harger and Ross, 2016) on employment and job creation. These studies 
find positive effects for incentives in particular industries such as the service and retail 
industries. Similarly, recent studies also examine the impact of the Tax Increment 
Financing Program (TIF) on the number of jobs created (Byrne, 2018) and the impact of 
“deal-closing” funds, such as Arkansas’ Quick Action Closing Fund (QACF) on job 
establishment and growth (Bundrick and Snyder, 2018). These researchers find that 
targeted incentives do not have a statistically significant impact on employment or offer 
the widespread benefits promised by the programs. Within these modern studies that have 
only examined particular incentive programs, there is at best minimal evidence that 
incentives affect the business location decision. In a recent review of the incentive 
literature, Bartik (2018) finds that most studies overestimate the importance of incentives. 
Based on the most recent studies, he concludes that incentives only alter the investment 
decision of firms 2 to 25 percent of the time. Clearly, the importance of incentives in the 
location process is still under debate, especially concerning the effect that these programs 
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could have on the attraction of FDI. The precise effect of incentives is difficult to 
determine because often the incentive variables tested in location models are rough 
proxies, cover short time periods, or are only available for very small sample sizes. 
Through the availability of the Bartik database, this study aims to bridge this gap by 
estimating the impact of the overall tax profile affecting medium to large export-oriented 
firms in a particular state. I not only consider the effect of three taxes but also incorporate 
the effect of five different incentives on the location decisions of firms.   
 
Section 1.3: Model 
 
The aim of this analysis is to assess how location characteristics, such as 
incentives or agglomeration affect new foreign manufacturing investments in a given 
county of the Midwestern and Southern regions of the United States. I choose to focus on 
these regions as these are the most probable location choices for a greenfield 
manufacturing firm. Figure 1.1 shows domestic manufacturing intensity throughout the 
country as measured by the location quotient. A higher location quotient, more 
specifically a location quotient above one, represents a higher density of manufacturing 
firms relative to other types of firms in the United States. As shown in the map, the 
Midwest (Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio) is particularly 
intensive in domestic manufacturing. Figure 1.2 shows the intensity of foreign 
manufacturing investment at the state level as measured by the location quotient. From 
this map, it is obvious that the Southeast stands out when it comes to foreign 
manufacturing investment. Historically, this area has often offered large incentive 
packages in order to lure potential investors.  As such, my model will examine location 
characteristics in the Southeast and Midwest. The states included in the Southeast are 
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Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, 
Tennessee, and Kentucky. In the Midwest, the relevant states are Michigan, Indiana, 
Ohio, Minnesota, Illinois, Missouri, and Wisconsin. As a result, the model will feature a 
choice set of 1,491 possible counties across sixteen states. With manufacturing FDI 
projected to expand, notably in the Southeast and Midwest/Great Lakes regions, it will 
continue to represent a major force in economic development.  
The most popular model used in empirical location studies to analyze location 
choice is a Count Data Model (CDM) (Arauzo-Carod et al., 2010). I also implement a 
CDM approach because the dependent variable is the count of new foreign investments in 
a given county.  
I estimate a panel Poisson regression with random effects. Under this analysis, the 
determinants of the firm location decision can be empirically estimated by calculating 
how changes in location characteristics affect the conditional expectation of the number 
of firms created in a particular county i in state k at time t. To derive marginal effects, it 
is assumed that the probability mass function of  !!"# is Poisson distributed. Along with 
these assumptions, the model also implies that the first two moments are "($_&'(	) =
	,!"# and -($_&'(	) = 	 ,!"# respectively. In count data it is not uncommon to find that the 
variance is larger than the mean; or in other words, the data are overdispersed. 
Overdispersion introduces similar problems as heteroskedasticity in ordinary least 
squares regressions. Tests reveal that my data are overdispersed. Estimating the model 
using robust standard errors can correct for this issue. When dealing with overdispersion, 
the model can be estimated using a negative binomial specification or estimated using a 
Poisson specification with robust standard errors. If the aim of the analysis is prediction, 
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a negative binomial is preferred over the Poisson. Instead, if the aim of the analysis is to 
model the conditional mean, the Poisson specification is preferred. The Poisson model 
will retain its consistency even if the count is not Poisson distributed provided that the 
conditional mean function is correctly specified (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). For these 
reasons, I estimate a Poisson model using robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
county level. 
The Poisson model also has several advantages that make it a preferred method in 
this analysis. First, it is capable of handling a large choice set. Other studies that use 
discrete choice methods, such as a conditional logit model, model the location choice at 
highly aggregated levels such as U.S. states which typically contain a lot of heterogeneity 
within them (Coughlin et al., 1991, Friedman et al., 1992, Head et al., 1999). This is 
problematic for two reasons. First, many relevant location factors, such as agglomeration 
and labor market characteristics, occur at the local level (Guimaraes et al., 2004). Second, 
in discrete choice models, only the locations that are chosen contribute to the likelihood 
function whereas under a CDM approach, the unchosen locations not only contribute to 
the likelihood function but they can importantly provide interesting insights (Arauzo-
Carod et al., 2010). Finally, in some cases the Poisson model can also circumvent the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption, which rarely holds under a 
conditional logit specification (Gabe and Bell, 2004). Because of these advantages, newer 








Section 1.3.1: Location Model 
 
Under this model, the probability of attracting a new foreign firm is assumed to be 
a function of both state and county location characteristics such that, 
 
./01(23456(!"#) = 7(8!"# , :"#), 
 
Where 23456(!"# represents the number of new investments made in county i in state k in 
year t, while 8!"#	and  :"# represent county and state characteristics that affect a given 
firm's spatial profit function respectively (List, 2001). Following Hausman et al., (1984), 
the Poisson parameter will be denoted as ,!"# , where ln(,!"#) = 	8!"#= + :"#?. Given 
these assumptions, the basic panel Poisson probability specification can be modeled as 
follows: 
 






Given the panel structure of the data, there may be serial correlation. To correct 
for this and estimate a more precise model, fixed or random effects are often used in 
regression analysis. In a fixed effects model, it is assumed that any unobservable factors 
that may impact the estimation are time invariant. A fixed effects model would not be 
appropriate in this case due to a lack of variation within the counties included in the 
dataset. Moreover, I am interested in understanding the effect of particular time invariant 
location characteristics.  For these reasons, I estimate a panel Poisson model with random 
effects. Under a random effects specification, the Poisson parameter is specified as ,+"#A =
,!"#B+"C  where B+"C	is a random county specific effect. Following Hausman et al., (1984), 
,+"#	A  will take the following form: 
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,+"#A = ,!"#B!" =	5,!"#-./"#0.1$.1!" , 
 
where D!" is the county specific effect and D2 is the overall intercept. The Poisson 
probability specification then becomes: 
 






The basic panel Poisson model that is estimated takes the following form: 
 
23456(!"# = B!" +	8!"#$3= +	:"#$3? +	E!" + F" +	G# +	H!"#, 
 
where Invest represents the count of foreign manufacturing investments in county i in 
state k at time t. As previously stated, investment is assumed to be a function of both 
county and state characteristics denoted by 8!"#$3 and  :"#$3	respectively. All state and 
county characteristics are entered as logs in the equation. To avoid taking the log of 1, I 
add 1 to all tax and incentive variables. I assume a prospective firm at time t takes into 
account all relevant location specific characteristics as of time (t-1). Variables that do not 
vary over time, such as county land area, are not lagged. Additionally, state taxes and 
incentives are not lagged as these “packages" are determined in the year in which the 
investment is made. Including a lag in the model for many of the area specific 
characteristics should also control for any possible endogeneity between these factors and 
investments in a given year. The main specification also controls for several time 
invariant county specific factors, E!" , a set of state dummies, F", to account for any 
unobservable or unmeasureable characteristics that may make a state more attractive to 
investors, as well as a set of year dummies, G#, to account for any factors that may 




Section 1.4: Data 
 
Estimation of the model requires information regarding foreign location decisions 
as well as state and county characteristics. Firm investment data come from fDi markets, 
a database maintained by the Financial Times, that includes cross-border greenfield 
investment information from 2003-2015. This database is unique in the level of detail that 
it offers. This data set includes the specific location of investment projects down to the 
city level. The database also identifies investor specific characteristics such as the name 
and origin of the investing company, the industry of the investment project by NAICS 
code, as well as the size of the investment as measured by the number of jobs created and 
the amount of capital invested. 
This study considers the effect of five different incentives and three different 
taxes that are relevant to manufacturing firms relative to fundamental determinants of 
FDI like agglomeration. The Bartik database includes the main state and local business 
taxes offered to firms such as business property taxes, state and local sales taxes on 
business inputs, and taxes on corporate income and state gross receipts. The included 
taxes represent over two-thirds of the total state and local tax burden a typical medium to 
large sized-export oriented manufacturing firm would face (Bartik, 2017).  The incentives 
that I consider include the job creation tax credit, investment tax credit, research and 
development credit, property tax abatement, and the customized job training subsidy. 
Similarly, the incentives that are included are not all encompassing, rather they represent 
the incentives a manufacturing firm is most likely to face. The focus of this database is on 
medium to large export-oriented firms as these are the ones that typically receive the 
most economic development dollars. The data are available by industry and are based on 
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a simulation of taxes and incentives a given firm would face if they decided to open a 
new facility in a particular state in a particular year. In the simulation, the present value 
of taxes and incentives is calculated using a 12 percent discount rate. This rate is selected 
based on the previous literature, which suggests that firms place a higher value on short 
term factors rather than long term factors. The database has the capability to simulate the 
tax and incentive rates a firm would experience in its first 20 years of operation. As I am 
only interested in the initial tax climate faced by an incoming firm, the simulation only 
runs for one year in the model. In order to calculate each of the tax and incentive rates, 
the database employs a hypothetical firm balance sheet. This balance sheet includes 
industry averages for the value-added, pre-tax profits, property asset mix, employment, 
wages, and R&D spending. Using this information, along with information on state and 
local tax rates and rules on how incentives are applied based on firm characteristics, the 
database is able to separately calculate state tax and incentive rates for each year of 
operation.  The present value of the stream of taxes and incentives is then calculated 
using a discount rate. The data are then reported as a percentage of the value added for 
the new firm. It is also important to note that we are using the average state incentive and 
tax as a percentage of the value added at each time period. It would be ideal to exploit 
variation in taxes and incentives given to firms within various manufacturing sectors in 
the same state; however, given the nature of the model and available data, I am unable to 
take advantage of such variation. 
There are several limitations of the Bartik dataset. The first is that incentives do 
not just occur at the state level. Previous literature has shown that localities also offer 
incentives and may even work with state officials to create a compensation package for a 
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particular industry or firm (Calcagno and Hefner, 2018).  While this may be the case, the 
Bartik dataset creates the state incentive numbers based on incentives offered in major 
metropolitan areas within the state. Most incentives typically go to companies that locate 
in the major metropolitan areas, which also represent the main “economic centers” of 
each state. Taxes may also differ across counties; however, any differences in taxes 
would pressure counties to offer similar net taxes after abatements (Bartik, 2017). 
Second, there are several important types of incentives that are excluded from the 
database.  These include “deal-closing" funds and other discretionary incentives that are 
used by government officials and economic development agencies to tip the firm location 
decision in their favor. While this would be interesting to include in the model, these 
types of offers are generally reserved for few large investments and the amounts offered 
can differ substantially among firms. Additionally, if such incentives were included, 
selection bias would affect the model estimates as any type of data coming from these 
types of incentives would only reflect accepted offers. Finally, any tax simulation should 
account for apportionment of corporate income. Generally, states do not only tax firms on 
profits made in the state; rather they also tax firms on profits a firm has made within the 
country. Any national profits made are typically apportioned to the state based on the 
share of property, payroll, and sales that occurred in that state (Bartik, 2017). 
Traditionally, each of these characteristics each received equal weight in the calculation. 
More recently, states have adjusted the formula in order to lower taxes for firms that have 
a large share of out of state sales, as these firms make up a significant portion of the 
state's export base. The Bartik database handles this by separating export-based firms 
from non-export base firms. For export-oriented firms, the effective corporate income tax 
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is the nominal corporate income tax rate which is then adjusted by the sales factor 
ranging from 1/3 to 1, depending on state rules. While this does not account for the full 
complexity of the U.S corporate tax code, it does reflect some of the more important rules 
that are imposed on corporations. As a result, the database should provide a good 
representation of the “standard deal", or the overall incentives and taxes offered to a new 
firm, in the manufacturing industry in a particular state and year. 
Additional data on state characteristics are pooled from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. County characteristics are 
drawn from the U.S Bureau of Census reports, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the U.S Department of Agriculture. The state and 
county-level location determinants have been selected based on a review of the previous 
empirical literature and regional economic theory. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 summarize each 
variable used, their definitions, and their anticipated signs. 
 
Section 1.5: State Hypotheses 
 
Table 1.1 displays all state characteristics that I use in my analysis. At the state 
level, the literature reveals that the main fundamental determinant of manufacturing 
location is agglomeration. Fundamentally, manufacturing firms are attracted by existing 
networks of agglomeration. In particular, it has been found that the spatial clustering of 
firms allows for productivity gains through knowledge transfer and supplier 
specialization. Additionally, it has been recognized that industrial clusters may also 
create large centralized labor pools that allow for better matching of workers to 
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employers (Howard et al., 2012). Most studies have found positive effects of 
manufacturing agglomeration on firm location decisions. 
Previous regional FDI research considers two different types of agglomeration: 
total domestic agglomeration and foreign agglomeration. In this study I test both foreign 
and domestic agglomeration factors. I assume foreign agglomeration occurs at the state 
level. Previous studies capture foreign agglomeration through the presence of existing 
manufacturing employment by foreign-owned firms in a given area (Head et al., 1999), 
previous FDI establishments (List 2001), or share of foreign-owned firms Guimaraes et 
al., (2004). Most of these studies find a positive effect of foreign agglomeration on the 
location decision of firms.  As in Head et al. (1999), I measure foreign agglomeration by 
the prior year's stock of manufacturing employment by foreign owned firms. A location 
that has been frequently selected by many other foreign firms should be attractive for a 
new foreign firm as well. This is the result of certain local characteristics that foreign 
firms would find attractive. A new firm could take advantage of information and 
networks that other foreign firms have already established. Cultural aspects could also 
dictate this relationship. For example, Head et al., (1999) finds that Japanese firms prefer 
locations that already have clusters of Japanese firms. I expect that a higher presence of 
foreign manufacturing employment concentration will increase the probability of 
investment by a new foreign firm. 
 
Section 1.5.1: Unionization and the Business Climate 
 
One characteristic of the labor market in the United States that may also affect 
foreign investors’ location, is the presence of unions. Previous literature has found mixed 
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results for the effect of unionization rates on manufacturing plant location. In an early 
study of U.S. manufacturing, unionization increased the probability of location (Bartik 
1985). For studies of FDI, however, Friedman et al., (1992) detects no effect for labor 
market characteristics. Zhuang (2016) finds insignificant effects of unionization.  
Nevertheless, most studies (Coughlin et al., (1991), Woodward (1992), Head et al., 
(1999), O’Huallachain and Reid (1997)) uncover that foreign-based manufacturing firms 
appear to prefer areas that are less unionized. 
As in previous studies, I measure unions as the percentage of the state employed 
population that is represented by unions. Unions represent an increased cost to incoming 
firms and may impede managerial control and operational flexibility. In the United 
States, companies increasingly avoid highly unionized areas, with manufacturing firms 
like Boeing even relocating to take advantage of lower costs in non-unionized areas like 
South Carolina (Olgin, 2017). Union participation should negatively affect the probability 
of investment. 
Both taxes and incentives in this database are reported as percentages of the 
value-added for the manufacturing industry. Value-added refers to the value of 
manufactured products above and beyond the value of the materials that went into the 
production process. This measure is used for various reasons. First, value added is an 
easier measure to compare across industries than something like profit which usually 
reflects some kind of tax planning. Second, the literature on business location commonly 
measures the impact of various costs in terms of the value added. For these reasons, it is 
only natural to express taxes and incentives, which represent increased/decreased costs to 
an incoming firm, as a percentage of the value-added (Bartik, 2017). The incentives listed 
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in Table 1.1 range from .06 percent of the value-added to 0.62 percent of the value-
added. The property tax abatement is the largest incentive offered in the sample while the 
research and development credit is the smallest incentive offered. The taxes range from 
0.9 percent to 2.66 percent of the value-added. The sales tax represents the smallest tax 
burden while the property tax represents the highest tax burden for firms in our model. 
All else equal, higher incentives should increase the probability of investment while 
higher taxes paid should decrease the probability of investment. 
 
Section 1.6: County Hypotheses 
 
Table 1.2 shows the county characteristics that I consider in the analysis. At the 
U.S. county level, the traditional locational determinants are agglomeration, workforce 
characteristics, infrastructure, and other local area specific characteristics. 
 
Section 1.6.1: Agglomeration 
 
As previously discussed, agglomeration is an important factor in the location 
decision process.  It is widely accepted that regions with high industry agglomeration will 
benefit from positive externalities of being in close proximity to other firms and workers. 
Both localization and urbanization economies are measured at the county level. 
 
Section 1.6.1.2: Establishments and Localization Economies 
 
Localization economies are the positive spillovers that a local manufacturing firm 
can benefit from by locating within a cluster of local establishments in the same industry. 
Previous studies capture this effect of total domestic agglomeration through the number 
of existing manufacturing plants in a county (Woodward 1992, Head et al., 1999), 
manufacturing employment (Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009) or production worker hours 
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by industry (McConnell and Schwab, 1990). Most of these studies have found positive 
and significant effects of domestic agglomeration on the location decision. In my 
analysis, local agglomeration will be captured by the total number of manufacturing 
establishments in a given county each year. As previously mentioned, there are many 
reasons why agglomeration should matter. Clusters of manufacturing firms may have 
already developed important infrastructure networks, supplier relationships, and a strong 
pool of highly skilled labor. For these reasons, it is expected that the county-level 
concentration of manufacturing establishments will be a positive and significant factor in 
the location decision. 
 
Section 1.6.1.3: Urbanization Economies 
 
Urbanization economies are the more general benefits that a manufacturing firm 
can benefit from that are generated through the interaction of various industries and 
clusters within a given region. It has been noted by previous studies that firms also 
receive benefits from urban agglomeration, or the activities of a diverse set of firms and 
services that occur in an area that may not necessarily be related to an industry (Arauzo-
Carod et al., 2010).  
This effect will be captured through an indicator for the urbanization of a given 
county. This measure comes from the U.S Department of Agriculture Typology Codes 
for Counties. A county is considered urban if it has a population of at least 50,000 or if it 
is economically tied to a neighboring urban county. This is expected to be a positive 
factor in the location decision. Urbanized areas are expected to have better infrastructure 




Section 1.6.1.4: Urban Wage Premium 
 
Another way that urbanization economies can be captured is through the urban 
wage premium. In the model, I enter the average weekly manufacturing wage in each 
county in each year. The county-level average wage is a measure of agglomeration which 
should reflect the higher productivity or skill of the workforce in a given area. This 
measure represents a labor force characteristic of the region. It is important to note that 
this is not the wage that is actually paid by the firm. The wage that is actually paid is 
negotiated and varies by investor. When foreign investors enter a new market, they start 
at a disadvantage relative to actual domestic competitors. In particular, they are 
unfamiliar with local laws and the business culture. In order to compete and succeed, it is 
logical that they must have a competitive advantage over domestic firms (Hymer, 1960). 
This could come from superior technology, branding, or better management. Without 
these advantages, FDI would not succeed in developed economies. For these reasons, it 
makes sense that foreign firm would not simply search for areas with low wages, rather 
they would look for areas that offer high productivity and worker quality. As it has been 
well documented that firms locate in areas with high concentrations of like firms, I expect 
higher local wages to increase the probability of investment. 
 
Section 1.6.2: Other Area Specific Characteristics 
 
Beyond the locational influences of incentives and agglomeration, firms choose 
among regions (states or counties) that have other potential influences on manufacturing 
production. Due to inconsistent and varying models, data, time periods, locations, and 
industries, there is no consensus on the most important local determinants of firm 
location decisions. However, other factors have also been found to have an effect. At the 
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local (or county level), firms seem to prefer areas that are better connected through 
transportation networks and offer better accessibility for product distribution.  This is 
confirmed by Coughlin et al., (1991) and Zhuang (2014). Zhuang (2014) finds that 
highway access seems to be the most important element of infrastructure, while airport 
and railroad connectivity did not have significant impacts for greenfield investment. 
Woodward (1992) finds that at the county level, highway access is most important for 
plants that are located in more rural areas. Infrastructure and access to markets have often 
been found to be positive factors for the firm, yet this may depend on the nature of the 
investment. I expect this result to also hold in this study, however, the importance of 
these factors may depend on the end goal of the investing firm. If the firm has national or 
international markets, or extensive national or international supply chains, then a longer 
distance to airports and ports should negatively impact the investment decision. To 
account for infrastructure characteristics, I calculate the centroid of each county in my 
data set. I then calculate the geodesic distance, in miles, from each county centroid to the 
nearest airport and port. Ideally, this measure would account for the distance from the 
actual investment to the nearest airport/port, however, my FDI data is not geocoded. 
While this is a limitation of the data, it should serve as a rough approximation for local 
area infrastructure characteristics. I expect a greater distance between a given county 
centroid and the nearest airport/port to decrease the probability of a foreign firm locating 
in that county. If the aim of the firm is to access local consumers or does not depend on 
distance to suppliers, then transport infrastructure may not matter.  
In previous research, land area is considered a proxy for the number of available 
locations within a state. Similarly, the county land area will be used as a proxy for the 
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number of available locations within a county. Increased availability of investment 
options should increase the probability of investment, and as previous results have found, 
it is assumed to be positive in this study as well.  
Finally, I will consider an indicator for counties that are in persistent poverty. The 
data also come from the U.S Department of Agriculture Typology Codes for Counties. 
Counties are classified as being in persistent poverty if at least 20 percent of their 
population was considered poor in the 1980, 1990, and 2000 census, as well as in the 
ACS 5-year estimates from 2007-2011. I choose to control for counties that are in 
persistent poverty because such areas may lack public services and infrastructure as well 
as have poor labor market conditions. I expect this variable to negatively impact the 
location decision. 
 
Section 1.7: Estimates of the Determinants of FDI 
 
The main results for five specifications of the model are presented in Table 1.3. 
The first column presents the results for the fundamental determinants of foreign 
investment. The second column considers the effect of net taxes, or the effect of taxes 
after incentives have been taken into account. The third column considers the aggregate 
tax and incentive variables of interest, while the fourth column breaks out the tax and 
incentive variables in order to determine which taxes or incentives may matter in the 
location decisions of firms. Ideally in this model, I would like to measure the effect of 
both property tax abatements and property taxes on the probability of investment. 
However, property tax abatements are used to offset the local property tax and 
traditionally abatements are higher in states with higher property taxes. For this reason, 
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these measures are highly correlated with each other. As such, I choose to measure the 
effect of the net property tax on the probability of investment. 
Generally, the traditional determinants all have the expected signs, and most are 
statistically significant at the ten percent level or higher. These estimated results are 
robust to the inclusion of the tax and incentive variables. It can be shown for the Poisson 
model that "($|8) = 	 5-4', =	=J . As all variables enter the estimation equation 
logarithmically, the reported coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities, representing 
the percentage change in the expected number of FDI projects given a one percent 
increase in the given variables (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013).  When considering the 
effect of net taxes, the results reveal that a one percent increase in the net tax paid as a 
percentage of total firm costs decreases the count of expected FDI projects by 
approximately 0.46 percent. When considering the overall effect of taxes and incentives 
in column 3, both variables have the correct sign and are statistically significant at the 
five percent significance level. Importantly, these results reveal that a one percent 
increase in total taxes as a percentage of total business costs decreases the expected 
number of FDI projects by 0.71 percent while a one percent increase in total incentives as 
a percentage of total business costs increases expected investment by 0.34 percent. 
In order to understand which incentives are driving these results, I consider the 
model in column 4. The following analysis comes from the results in column 4. As 
expected, most of the variables that represent increased costs are negative but only a few 
are statistically significant at the 10 percent significance level or higher. Higher union 
participation decreases investment, but this is not statistically significant. This 
insignificant result could be due to the inclusion of state controls in the analysis. The 
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negative result, however, is as expected; when firms locate in such areas, they may have 
to deal with higher wages and regulations when hiring employees which increases the 
overall cost of doing business. These results also confirm that transportation costs are a 
significant factor in the location decision. Increased distance to airports and ports 
negatively affect the location decision. For a one percent increase in distance to an 
airport, expected investment decreases by 0.14 percent. This indicates that firms are more 
likely to choose areas that are well connected, and which allow them to more easily 
transport goods to new markets. Note that distance to ports is not statistically significant. 
This could indicate that these firms are not necessarily exporting their goods overseas. It 
is more likely that the markets they aim to reach when they locate in the United States are 
located within the country. 
As expected, county land area was positive and statistically significant. A one 
percent increase in county land area increases the probability of investment by 0.19 
percent. Larger land area signals more investment opportunity. Firms are drawn to 
counties that have more space available on which to build their facilities. Larger counties 
could also benefit firms that have long investment horizons and may wish to expand 
operations in the future. 
The variables that represent both foreign and domestic agglomeration were 
positive and statistically significant factors in the FDI location decision. Localization 
economies, as measured by the total manufacturing agglomeration at the county level, has 
a larger impact on investment than foreign agglomeration at the state level. Investment 
increases by an approximate 0.92 percent for a one percent increase in the number of 
domestic establishments in a given county. Areas with higher FDI employment do not 
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appear to significantly attract more investment. This indicates that foreign firms value 
areas that have high industry concentration. Areas with a higher number of existing 
manufacturing firms are more favorable because they have existing supplier networks 
and specialized pools of labor.  Additionally, high industry agglomeration allows for 
learning and other beneficial spillover effects. 
Moreover, the results suggest that companies value the skill of the local labor 
force. From these results, it appears that firms do not look for low skilled labor that they 
can pay less. Rather they search for a more specialized labor pool that they can pay 
according to their productivity. Urban wages, which represent productivity, are a positive 
and significant factor in the location decision. A one percent increase in the average 
weekly manufacturing wage increases expected investment by approximately 1.31 
percent. This also points to another key feature of foreign investment. In order to 
overcome their foreign disadvantage, foreign investors choose to locate in areas with 
higher worker skill and productivity and as a result they choose to pay their workers 
accordingly. 
From a policy perspective, the most interesting and compelling results come from 
the variables representing taxes and incentives. Taxes and incentives seem to have a 
considerable effect on investment decisions. These variables generally have the predicted 
signs; however, the findings suggest that certain taxes and incentives matter more than 
others. The corporate income tax was the only tax that was a statistically significant 
factor in the FDI location decision. A one percent increase in the corporate income tax as 
a percentage of local firm costs decreases the expected number of FDI projects by 0.46 
percent.   In terms of incentives, the investment tax credit is the only incentive that is 
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positive and statistically significant. The results indicate that a one percent increase in the 
investment tax credit as a percentage of local firm costs, increases the expected number 
of FDI projects by 1.56 percent. 
These results suggest that taxes and incentives do matter for the location decision 
of firms. This complements some of the previous findings in the urban and regional 
economics literature (Bartik, 1991, Peters and Fisher, 2004, Arauzo-Carod et al., 2010, 
Bartik, 2018, Walckzak, 2018). This is a relevant finding that could help inform today's 
debate over taxes and their effect on investment in the United States. The recent Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act, aimed at promoting economic growth, reduced the corporate income tax 
from 35 percent to 21 percent. The purpose of this legislation was to make the United 
States more competitive relative to other nations.  On top of the national tax, states also 
levy corporate income taxes. Out of the 44 states that do levy a corporate income tax, the 
average state corporate income tax is 6 percent. The corporate income tax ranges from 3 
percent in North Carolina to 12 percent in Iowa. In my sample, the states with the highest 
tax rates are Minnesota (9.8 percent) and Illinois (9 percent) (Walckzak, 2018). States 
wanting to attract manufacturing FDI may be able to make themselves even more 
competitive through lower corporate income taxes. 
The only incentive that was statistically significant in the foreign location 
decision was the investment tax credit. The property tax abatement had no measurable 
impact on the investment decision. This is surprising as the property tax abatement has 
long been one of the most significant subsidies for capital intensive firms like 
manufacturers. These results could have occurred for two reasons. First, the Bartik 
database does not account for the full complexity of the property tax abatement. The 
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database does not model Tax Increment Financing (TIF) programs which typically allow 
special property tax exemptions for firms. Second, the simulation only runs for one year 
as we are only interested in the full value of the incentive package at the time the 
investment is made. This could plausibly result in some downward bias in the results. 
Generally, property tax abatements are granted on a case by case basis to particular firms. 
This incentive can also be structured in many ways which is not fully captured by the 
database. It is not unusual for such a subsidy to last up to 30 years. Firms may receive a 
specific tax reduction for a specified amount of time. Localities could also allow for the 
property tax itself to be phased in over a certain number of years, until the full property 
tax rate is reached. Alternatively, the property tax may be frozen at the time the deal is 
signed, which could benefit firms that may wish to expand in the future. Sometimes, 
firms may even make payments in lieu of taxes, which usually consist of a yearly 
payment to the school system at a lower rate than the tax itself (Good Jobs First, 2018). 
The property tax abatement is controversial, so its effect is important to 
understand. Local governments often support the subsidy because they argue that 
otherwise, they may not have had any investment in the community. There is also some 
debate as to whether the companies that receive the abatement actually value them. These 
subsidies can be detrimental to school districts as well as fire and police departments 
which generally receive a majority of their funding through state property taxes (Good 
Jobs First, 2018). Property tax abatements tend to be highest in states with higher 
property tax rates. South Carolina, Michigan, and Tennessee have high property taxes 
relative to the national average and consequently also have higher property tax 
abatements. While this incentive does not appear to lure manufacturing investments to a 
 
33 
given area, further research should examine the extent to which the community may be 
affected by the property tax abatement. 
While the property tax abatement was the most important incentive in the 1990’s, 
the investment tax credit has recently experienced the largest increase in use over time 
(Bartik, 2017). Investment tax credits are typically offered to firms that invest in new 
property, plants, equipment, or machinery in the state. This investment must be deemed a 
“qualified” investment by the state to be awarded. Typically, this credit is offered to firms 
that invest in new property only as opposed to those that renovate existing properties 
(Walckzak, 2018). Investment tax credits are particularly large in southeastern states like 
Alabama, Kentucky, and South Carolina. This incentive had the highest impact on the 
probability of investment relative to all other incentives considered in this study. A one 
percent increase in the investment tax credit as a percentage of local firm costs increased 
the number of expected FDI projects by 1.56. This could be because this incentive is only 
given once at the start of the project whereas other incentives like the property tax 
abatement may be phased in over a longer period. It could also be the case that capital-
intensive firms like manufacturers, make need this type of incentive to offset their very 
high startup costs. This is important to understand in the context of the Foxconn debate.  
They were offered over 1.3 billion dollars in investment tax credits. Interestingly, in the 
case of Foxconn, they were offered over 150 million dollars in sales tax exemption, 









Section 1.8: Simulation of Changes in Incentive and Tax Rates 
 
Given that taxes and incentives do seem to matter in the investment decision, I 
consider the effect of changes to the current incentive/tax levels. These findings are 
presented in Table 1.4. In this experiment, I start with a base prediction which shows the 
expected number of FDI projects in a county in a particular year holding all of the 
variables constant at their means and assuming the random effect is zero. The expected 
number of FDI projects from this base prediction is 0.05. Next I assume the investment 
tax credit is zero and perform the same exercise to find that the expected number of FDI 
projects is 0.03. This prediction is statistically significant and represents a 40 percent 
decrease in the predicted number of FDI projects. When performing the same exercise 
with the corporate income tax rate, I find that moving from the mean corporate tax rate of 
1.18 percent to zero corporate income taxes, the number of FDI projects increases by 35 
percent. This is a considerable increase, however, not as large as the decrease in 
investment from a reduction in the investment tax credit. In the last column, I assume all 
incentives are zero while holding all other variables constant at their means and find that 
the expected number of FDI projects is 0.04, representing an approximate 36 percent 
decrease in the number of FDI projects. In the following rows of the table, I take the 25th, 
50th, and 75th percentile values of the incentive/tax variables considered and use those 
values to predict the expected number of FDI projects while holding all other variables at 
their means. These results indicate that the biggest increase to the number of expected 
FDI projects would come from significantly increasing the investment tax credit. An 
increase of the investment tax credit from its 50th percentile value of 0.08 percent of 
business costs to its 75th percentile value of 0.74 percent of business costs increases the 
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predicted number of FDI projects by approximately 129 percent. A similar increase in the 
corporate income tax only decreases the predicted number of FDI projects by 4 percent. 
When examining the effect of moving from the 50th percentile values for all incentives to 
their 75th percentile values, I demonstrate a very large increase in the predicted number 
of FDI projects. An increase from the 50th to the 75th percentile of all incentives 
increases the predicted number of FDI projects by approximately 128 percent. 
 
Section 1.9: Conclusion 
 
Incentives are often justified because they induce investment by new firms thus 
bringing new jobs to a locality. In theory, this should increase demand for local goods 
and services and should increase economic growth (Peters and Fisher, 2004). While it has 
long been recognized that incentives can impact the location decisions of foreign 
investors, it has been difficult to assess this impact due to a lack of data. In this paper I 
bring together two important databases, fDi Markets and the Bartik database, to address 
this gap in the literature. To my knowledge this paper is the first to test the importance of 
the most common taxes and incentives that foreign manufacturers face, in the location 
decision. My analysis reveals that the tax and incentive climate in a particular state do 
impact the location decisions of manufacturing FDI. Through a panel Poisson regression 
with random effects, I find that the corporate income tax has an elasticity of 0.46 while 
other taxes have no measurable impact on the location decision. Additionally, the 
investment tax credit has the most significant pull in the business location decision with 
an elasticity of 1.56. This finding is robust across all specifications considered. It could 
be the case that capital-intensive manufacturing firms highly value these types of 
incentives in order to offset their often very large start-up costs.  
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The results also confirm that agglomeration economies still matter. Investors tend 
to locate in areas where manufacturing agglomeration is highest so that they may take 
advantage of existing networks and other beneficial spillovers from nearby firms. These 
findings are robust across almost all specifications considered. I find that a one percent 
increase in domestic manufacturing agglomeration in a given county increases investment 
by approximately 0.92 percent. Urban agglomeration economies, as captured by the 
urban wage premium, can be even more important than localization economies in the 
location decision. I find that a one percent increase in the average weekly manufacturing 
wage increases investment by approximately 1.31 percent. 
The analysis provided in this paper only pertains to the U.S market, however, 
these findings can also be generalized to other areas. Incentives are also used 
internationally to target FDI. While foreign countries offer far less incentives at the local 
level than do the United States, there is one important factor that ties these findings to 
other areas. This study finds that agglomeration economies are among the most 
significant factors in the location decision. This type of finding is consistent with findings 
in previous literature analyzing markets around the world (Guimareas et al., 2000). 
Future research should examine the extent to which these results hold across various 
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       Table 1.2: County Characteristics 
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    Table 1.3: Estimates of the Determinants of FDI 
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THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: THE EFFECT OF HISTORICAL AND 
CULTURAL AFFILIATIONS ON THE ALLOCATION OF FDI IN 
EASTERN EUROPE 
Section 2.1: Introduction 
 
Culture is an integral aspect of international business and economic decisions. 
When foreign firms decide to invest in a new country, they typically do so at a 
disadvantage relative to domestic firms. They must not only successfully establish 
operations in a new country, but they must do so while navigating a new culture, as well 
as relatively unfamiliar legal systems, organizational and managerial practices, and 
communication and negotiation styles. In this sense, their “foreignness” becomes a 
liability the greater the cultural distance between home and host country (Beugelsdijk and 
Maseland, 2011). This fundamental hypothesis is extensively studied in the academic 
literature (Zaheer, 1995). Yet, the causal impact of culture on the location of FDI has 
been difficult to determine. This results from the fact that culture is difficult to define and 
is often entangled in other societal aspects such as historical ties, institutions, the political 
economy, religion, ethnicity, language, and nationality which can also affect the 
allocation of FDI.  
To understand the potential effect of culture and historical ties on the allocation 
FDI, I implement a spatial regression discontinuity design to test for discontinuous 
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changes in investment at the historical border of the Habsburg Empire. The former 
empire had a border which ran through several present-day countries including Romania, 
Serbia, Poland, and the Ukraine. In this study, I choose to focus on two countries 
specifically: Romania and Serbia1. Cities located on either side of this historical border 
have shared common institutions for the last 100 years.  Any difference in the distribution 
of FDI on either side of this border should be attributed to the Habsburg cultural effect 
and the potential historical ties that were developed as a consequence of the previous 
empire affiliation.  Several papers show that historical empire affiliations may affect the 
level of economic development today. Grosjean (2013) explores the effect of Ottoman 
rule on financial development today. She shows that Islamic rule is associated with lower 
levels of bank penetration across and within countries. When examining the effect of the 
empire within countries she notes that while the financial system is less developed in 
these areas, no other factors such as income or business development are affected. 
Peisakhin (2012) demonstrates that the Habsburg and Russian empires influenced the 
political identities and social norms of individuals living on either side of this no longer 
existing border in the Ukraine. In particular, differences in social attitudes towards Russia 
persist today. Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2013) examine the historical division of Poland 
between three empires: the Russian, Habsburg, and Prussian empires. The authors find no 
 
1 It would be interesting to also include Ukraine and Poland in the analysis. These 
countries were dropped from the sample for several reasons. I chose not to include 
Ukraine as there was limited data available at the regional level. This would not allow me 
to check the robustness of the findings as I do for Serbia and Romania. I chose not to 
include Poland as the basic assumptions of the model did not hold in this case. There was 
no evidence of a discontinuity in the number of Habsburg projects for Habsburg investors 
at the Habsburg border. In fact, there was very little FDI in the former empire territory 
overall. This could be due to the fact that the former empire territory in Poland was a very 
small part of the country as a whole. Additionally, this region seemed to have a different 
history and experience with the empire than did the regions of Romania and Serbia.    
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differences in income, industry, corruption or trust today, however, they do observe a 
persistence of culture as exhibited through religious practices and beliefs in democracy. 
Becker et al. (2014) show that Habsburg empire affiliation affects the levels of trust that 
individuals have in their court systems and police force today. These papers suggest that 
prior empire affiliations may affect the path of economic development. Papers that 
specifically examine the impact of the Habsburg empire, present evidence of a long-
lasting cultural impact in former empire territories. 
Building on these findings, I propose that the Habsburg Empire strongly 
influenced the culture of the territories it controlled, and that impact can be found in 
contemporary investment decisions. Therefore, it is likely that territories formerly 
belonging to the Habsburg empire would be more likely to attract FDI from countries 
also sharing a historical tie to the empire today. 
The main analysis reveals that the number of FDI projects from Habsburg 
affiliated countries is higher in the former empire portion of present-day Romania and 
Serbia today. Specifically, there are approximately 0.24 to 0.32 more “empire” projects 
per 10,000 individuals in former empire territories. There is no evidence of such a jump 
in investment projects from the rest of the world at this same border.  Additionally, I find 
no evidence of a jump in any other characteristics that may impact this allocation of FDI 
at the former empire border. 
Many of the previous studies examining the effect of culture on FDI are 
conducted at the country level and examine only one aspect of culture such as language 
or religion. However, culture is much larger than just one element of a population. 
Common language and religion are rough proxies for the elements that unite a people. 
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While institutions also matter, most formal institutions are typically at the national level, 
making it difficult to determine whether the effect captured is due to institutions or 
culture. Other papers in the cultural economics and business literature use the Hofstede 
index to calculate a cultural distance between countries. While this index made great 
strides in allowing comparisons of cultural distance between countries, it also has many 
shortcomings. First, culture may not be homogeneous within a country which may also 
affect the distribution of FDI. Additionally, the distance between two countries may not 
be symmetric. Finally, it is also a concern that all components of the Hofstede index are 
typically given equal weight in distance calculations; it is very possible that some 
dimensions may matter more in some business contexts than others (Beugelsdijk and 
Maseland, 2011). By defining culture as belonging to a historical empire and examining 
variations in investment patterns within countries, I am able to separate the effect of 
culture from nationality, language, and formal institutions. This allows me to capture the 
effect of cultural differences and historical ties on the allocation of FDI today. 
In the next section I place my research in the context of the current literature. 
Section 2.3 examines the historical background of the Habsburg empire in order to better 
understand the mechanisms through which the empire affiliation may have impacted the 
cultural and spatial allocation of FDI today. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 introduce the data and 
methodology and Section 2.6 presents the main results of the analysis. Section 2.7 









Section 2.2: Literature Review 
 
Section 2.2.1 The Impact of History on Economic Development 
 
It is now accepted that historic events can impact economic development today. 
The importance of history for economic development is documented in a review of the 
literature by Nunn (2009). In previous studies the impact of history is mainly examined 
under the context of Europe’s colonization and expansion. The channel through which 
history impacts development is through the effect that it can have on institutions (Nunn, 
2009). There are three main strands of literature which explore this proposition.  The first 
strand of literature relates the importance of factor endowments and colonial rule to 
economic development. Engerman and Sokoloff (1994) examine differences in land 
endowments suitable for the cultivation of traded crops, like sugar, which were best 
produced on large scale plantations using slave labor. The study reveals that areas relying 
on slave labor promoted laws that protected the elites which resulted in political and 
economic inequality. While this first paper was primarily qualitative, subsequent 
extensions of this hypothesis also find negative relationships between the past use of 
slavery and economic development measures across states and counties, and new world 
countries today (Mitchener and McLean, 2003, Lagerlof, 2005, Nunn, 2009). 
The second strand of literature examines the role of legal institutions transplanted 
during colonial rule and their effects on investor protection and financial development. 
For example, La Porta et al. (1997) find that British common law offers the greatest 
investor protection today.  
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The final strand of literature examines the historical origins of current institutions 
and their importance for long term economic development. The seminal Acemoglu et al. 
(1997) paper examines the disease environment in former colonies. The authors in this 
paper hypothesize that Europeans were more likely to settle in areas with less disease. As 
a result, Europeans were only able to set up growth promoting institutions, which 
protected property rights, in areas where they settled. In contrast, Europeans did not often 
settle in areas with harsher disease environments, and instead chose to set up extractive 
institutions in these colonies. The authors use an instrumental variable approach using 
early European settler mortality rates as the instrument for institutions to show that areas 
with lower mortality rates have higher per capita incomes today. These papers made great 
strides in determining that history impacts economic development. However, these papers 
do not explore why regions within countries may experience varying levels of economic 
development today. This paper differs importantly from this body of literature by 
building upon the fact that history matters by examining the effect of history on regional 
development today. 
Several papers make important contributions in the analysis of how history 
matters at the regional level. Dell (2010) examines the effect of the mita, a forced mining 
labor system established in Peru and Bolivia between 1573 and 1812. This paper uses a 
regression discontinuity design to compare outcomes in mita and non mita districts today. 
By comparing outcomes very close to the border, she shows that the mita had negative 
effects on long term economic development. Specifically, the author finds that 
consumption is 32 percent lower in the mita side which is driven by lower levels of 
education and less developed road networks. This is attributed to the fact that mita 
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governments restricted large land holdings and it was the landowners that typically 
lobbied for a greater provision of public goods. In this case, history impacted the 
concentration of wealth and power which impacted the development path of these 
regions.  
Ambrus et al. (2020) examine how disease can permanently alter the growth path 
of urban areas. In this paper the authors investigate the impact of the cholera epidemic in 
one London neighborhood.  The cholera outbreak in this neighborhood was devastating. 
In one month, 5 percent of families lost their main wage earners and became 
impoverished. The authors demonstrate that this incident had an effect on neighborhood 
poverty, as captured by real estate prices, immediately after the outbreak. These 
differences in real estate prices persist even 160 years after the end of the epidemic 
suggesting that such localized health shocks can affect the trajectories of cities today. 
This paper will employ similar methodologies to Dell (2010) and Ambrus et al. (2020), 
however it will build on this regional literature to examine the impact of history on 
another important aspect of economic development, the allocation of FDI today. 
 
Section 2.2.2: The Effect of History and Institutions on Culture 
 
While it is evident from this discussion that history matters for economic 
development, history can also have lasting effects on cultural development. One 
important characteristic that history can affect is trust. Rather than examining the 
historical effect on income or consumption, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) examine the 
role of history on trust in the context of the slave trade in Africa. They find very strong 
impacts of the number of slaves taken from an individual’s ethnic group on an 
 
49 
individual’s trust in others today. The authors hypothesize that individuals carry culture 
with them while institutions are fixed in place. They use this definition to see which 
effects, culture or institutions, have a bigger impact on trust. If culture matters more, it 
should matter whether an individual’s ancestors were enslaved. If institutions matter 
more, it should matter whether an individual currently lives in an area that was 
historically affected by the slave trade. The authors find evidence that both factors matter, 
but the effect of culture is stronger than the effect of institutions on trust.  
Exploiting the location of the Habsburg empire in Eastern Europe, Becker et al. 
(2014) show that the Habsburg empire had persistent effects on the trust of individuals 
living in former empire regions today. The authors use the 2006 Life in Transitions 
survey data and employ a border specification to test whether individuals living in cities 
within 200 kilometers of the Habsburg border have higher trust in courts and police 
today. In addition, to higher trust in institutions, the authors also show that the Habsburg 
affiliation also impacts the extent to which individuals feel that they must pay bribes in 
courts or to police. The authors propose that the Habsburg empire established cultural 
norms which are still present in the interactions of individuals with their respective 
institutions today. This paper lays an interesting and compelling foundation for my study. 
Since the empire affected cultural and social norms in former empire territories, this 
setting is an important one in which to examine the impact of these norms on FDI. It has 
long been recognized that culture can impact the allocation of FDI but compelling 







Section 2.2.3: Culture, Institutions, History, and FDI 
 
There are several determinants of FDI that are well known. Of these determinants, 
one of the most important is distance. Distance can make international exchanges costly 
(Makino and Tsang, 2011). Geographic distance increases transportation costs. 
Institutional distance affects the success and profitability of a prospective firm in a new 
location, as both formal and informal institutions define the rules of the game that shape 
economic exchanges and interactions (North, 1990). Historical ties are important in 
reducing costs since they can shape shared values, norms, and cultural beliefs. Historical 
ties can also affect expectations and reduce uncertainty in international exchanges 
(Makino and Tsang, 2011). Rangan (2000) argues that historical ties make the search and 
assessment of potential locations easier and less costly while also making ongoing 
operations more efficient. Additionally, interactions among countries which share 
historical ties may result in a positive feedback loop, where any similarities in cultural 
norms or institutions positively reinforce historical ties. This can also serve to narrow the 
“distance” between countries. Cultural distance can also be costly. Cultural distance can 
create behavioral uncertainty and can affect an investor’s commitment to invest. 
Furthermore, it can impact the performance of the foreign firm in the new market. For 
these reasons, understanding the intricacies of culture and its effect on FDI is imperative 
to business leaders. Several studies find evidence of this effect (Beugelsdijk et al., 2018). 
Makino and Tsang (2011) examine the importance of historical ties in the timing 
of FDI flows into Vietnam following the market opening. The authors show that culture 
has a differential impact on the timing of investment. Specifically, the authors find that 
investors from Mainland China moved in later than investors from Taiwan and Hong 
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Kong. This is a significant finding since Vietnam has historically experienced strained 
relations with Mainland China following the Sino-Vietnamese War.  The authors also 
show that investors from socialist countries were early movers. This is a similar finding 
to Crane et al. (2005) who find that Russian investors are more likely to invest in former 
Soviet Republics today. Additionally, Makino and Tsang (2011) show that colonial ties 
can matter through their finding that French speaking countries were early movers. 
Glaister et al. (2020) examine the effect of prior colonial relationships on FDI in 
Africa. This is an excellent setting in which to examine this issue as Africa’s history is 
best characterized by colonialism. Colonialism has persistent impacts on the language, 
institutional structures, and business practices of former colonies. Each of these factors 
can reduce the liability of foreignness (Liou and Rao-Nicholson, 2017). History can also 
create informal institutions that are hard to overcome. The ingrained image of a country 
or a potential investor, is an example of an informal institution that can form through 
historical ties. This could be a positive image or a negative stigma that is associated with 
the investor, affecting the subsequent success of the foreign investor (Glaister et al., 
2020). For example, former colonies may experience negative feelings towards their 
colonizer stemming from past labor exploitation, and resource depletion (Jones, 2013, 
Nunn, 2007). Glaister et al. (2020) find a positive effect of prior colonial ties on inward 
FDI; however, the nature and influence of these historical ties are more complex than 
previously considered and vary with the colonizer. There is a positive effect on inward 
FDI from British investors. The authors suggest that British colonizers engaged in greater 
institutional development than other colonizers. This may have resulted in a positive 
historical tie between countries, making former colonies more open to receiving 
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investment from British investors. The authors also find that the length of the colonial 
period negatively affects inward FDI, while the length of independence exhibits a u-
shaped effect. Immediately following independence, due to a recent association of 
oppression, there is a negative effect on FDI. However, with time, the benefits of a longer 
shared history outweigh the negative effects of colonialism, generating a positive effect 
of the length of independence on FDI. While making important theoretical contributions 
for the importance of culture and history on FDI, both Makino and Tsang (2011) and 
Glaister et al. (2020) only present evidence of the importance of culture on FDI at the 
country level. 
Only a few other papers examine discontinuities in FDI and trade within 
countries. Ma (2017) examines the effect of language on the allocation of FDI in China. 
Ma (2017) examines investments from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan at the borders of 
various dialects in China to show that cultural similarity increases FDI.  Egger and 
Lassman (2015) examine import behavior at native language boundaries in Switzerland 
to show that culture can affect international trade. They find that on average more 
products are imported from areas with a common native language (Egger and Lassmann, 
2015).  Both of these papers are methodologically similar to my paper in that they take 
advantage of the regional heterogeneity of culture within a country to estimate the impact 
on FDI or trade today. However, as discussed in previous literature, language is only one 
small facet of culture. It is cultural norms that can be more impactful. North (1995) 
suggests that while formal institutions can quickly change, informal institutions are less 
likely to change and may even endure over time. Since cities on either side of the long-
gone Habsburg border have shared common institutions for the last 100 years, I do not 
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argue that formal institutions impact the allocation of FDI today. Rather it is the informal 
institutions, or the cultural norms, that can impact the allocation of FDI. Becker et al. 
(2014) show that Habsburg empire affiliation affected the trust in institutions and 
perceived corruption that individuals living in former empire territories have today. 
However, based on these findings, it is not directly evident how this could affect FDI. It 
is possible that the empire affiliation shaped the cultural norms of individuals and 
therefore impacted the functioning of the same institutions today (Tabellini, 2010). 
However, if the only impact of the empire affiliation is the functioning of local 
institutions, there would be a discontinuity in all FDI at the border. If the empire 
affiliation affected cultural norms through a historical tie, there should only be a 
discontinuity in FDI originating from other former Habsburg territories. To my 
knowledge this paper is the first to test these factors along with the intricacies of culture 
and historical ties and their effects on FDI at a regional level. In order to understand the 
context and mechanisms through which the empire affiliation may have impacted the 
allocation of FDI today, it is important to understand the history and influence of the 
Habsburg empire in Romania and Serbia. 
 
Section 2.3: The Historical Background of the Habsburg Empire 
 
The royal house of Habsburg was one of the most powerful and influential 
families in Europe. As early as the 11th century the house had acquired lands as far west 
as Spain and as far as Galicia (Poland) in the East. The association of the Habsburg name 
with Austria began when Rudolf IV of House Habsburg, ascended to the throne of the 
Holy Roman Empire in 1273. After that time, the empire continuously expanded 
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eastward through wars until more than half of Europe was controlled by the House of 
Habsburg (Becker et al., 2014).  
The major influence of the empire in Eastern Europe began when Ferdinand of 
Austria was elected King of Hungary, Croatia, and Bohemia. It was at this time that the 
Austrians had to seriously contend with the force of the Ottoman Empire. The Habsburgs 
drove further into Eastern Europe, each time pushing the Ottoman Empire back even 
further. In 1684, the Ottomans failed to capture Vienna for a second time which marked 
the beginning of the Habsburg dominance in Eastern Europe (Becker et al., 2014). 
One of the defining characteristics of the empire is that even though the empire 
was composed of many states and cultures, the ruling class largely respected and 
protected its citizens. The citizens recognized this and considered the bureaucracy to be 
reliable, honest, and hard-working. The laws were fair and efficient, and it was the legal 
system that served as a uniting factor throughout an empire composed of many different 
ethnic groups. The ruling style of the empire was very decentralized until the rule of 
Maria Theresa in the mid-18th century. She established a set of governors that would 
supervise local administrations throughout the empire. Once a new territory fell under 
Habsburg rule, the old administration was abolished, and a new Austrian governor would 
be installed. This governor was charged with establishing a new local administration, 
often filling roles with natives that had been sent for training in Vienna. Due to the 
competency of the Austrian trained administration, these institutions sometimes remained 
in place even after a territory became autonomous (Becker et al., 2014). 
Maria Theresa’s son, Josef II, carried on this legacy and enhanced her policies by 
instilling legal reforms, ending censorship, and promoting education. Josef also went on 
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to found institutions of social and medical care and laid the foundations for infrastructure 
development. Josef gave subsidies to fund infrastructure projects such as railroads in less 
developed parts of the empire in order to encourage integration (Becker et al., 2014). This 
included highway development and improvements in the navigability of the Danube 
River and the Save and Kulpa Rivers in Hungary. By 1800, 7,460 km of highways were 
in existence throughout the empire. By WWI, 40,000 km of railways were built 
throughout the empire. Connecting the financial heart of Vienna to major cities 
throughout the empire was important for the unity of the empire as well as for the 
transportation of goods and services which would lay the foundation for economic 
growth (Good, 1984). 
Throughout the 18th century, the empire made a conscious effort to industrialize 
and develop. Mercantilist policies were enacted to develop the agricultural regions of the 
empire. In the Bohemian lands, subsidies were given to machine builders and inventors 
were given exclusive production privileges for several years. The textile and iron 
industries also experienced lessening restrictions. Political advisors tried to encourage the 
movement away from agriculture by encouraging manufacturing in Hungary and the less 
developed regions of Austria. Plans were made to increase Hungarian productivity in the 
areas of textile, leather, paper and wood products, and iron manufacturing. Tariff barriers 
were reduced or eliminated (Good, 1984).  
In the 18th century, the economic development of the empire was split between 
west and east. The western portion of the empire was much more industrialized while the 
eastern portion was more agrarian. According to several historians, economic 
development started in the western portion of the empire and slowly moved east. During 
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this time, the western portion of the empire had several strong industries. These industries 
included a strong linen/woolen textile industry as well as a glass industry and chemical 
industry. Austria was a strong center of mining and metallurgy. By the late 1700’s, 
Austria was one of the largest producers of pig iron in all of Europe with the Styrian 
region in Austria producing more iron than all of England. At this time, the Eastern 
portion of the empire was specialized in grain and livestock production (Good, 1984).  
In Hungary, the main strength was the flour milling industry. Croatia-Slavonia 
had some grain production, but it could not compete with the output from Hungary. This 
pushed the Serbian region towards livestock production. In Transylvania, the main 
industry was mining and metallurgy. The expansion of the rail and credit networks in the 
region allowed Transylvania to have easy access to Budapest. This stimulated the 
industry further allowing the region to become a major exporter of coal, pig iron, and 
timber.  In the years leading up to WWI, Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia had much 
larger industries and industrial output than their neighbors: Romania, Serbia, and 
Bulgaria (Good, 1984). 
A turning point for the empire occurred in 1866. In 1866, Austria was defeated 
and considerably weakened in the Austrian-Prussian War. This forced Austria to 
relinquish control of Lombardy-Venetia to Italy and with the dissolution of the German 
Confederation, it also lost its status as the leader of the German speaking states. The war 
left Austria in great deal of debt (Republic of Austria Parliament, 2020). It was around 
this time that the current emperor, Franz Joseph decided to reexamine the empire’s 
affairs. By this time there was unrest in the empire as many ethnic groups, especially the 
Hungarians, were demanding equal status with the Austrians. In fear of losing even more 
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power, the Austrians engaged in negotiations with the Hungarians which ended in the 
Ausgleich of 1867. This compromise regulated the relations between Austria and 
Hungary and created the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Through the negotiations, it was 
decided that the Hungarians would have full internal autonomy. The two powers would 
remain united for war and other foreign affairs and would operate under a customs union 
which would be reevaluated every ten years. Austria and Hungary would both have their 
own constitutions, with their own governments, and parliaments. The parliament was 
composed of an appointed upper house and an elected lower house. They both remained 
under the rule of a common emperor, his court, and ministers of foreign affairs and war. 
Franz Joseph was crowned the King of Austria-Hungary and Gyula Andrassy was named 
the first prime minister of Hungary (Republic of Austria Parliament, 2020). 
Even under the newly organized empire, many of the laws protecting citizens’ 
rights remained. The Fundamental Laws, which became known as the December 
Constitution, were instated in 1867 and lasted until the dissolution of the empire. These 
laws ensured equality, freedom of speech, press and assembly and protected the rights of 
minority groups. They proclaimed that “all nationalities in the state enjoy equal rights, 
each one having an inalienable right to the preservation and cultivation of its nationality 
and language.” The equal rights of all languages in local use were guaranteed by the state 
in schools, administration, and public life (Republic of Austria Parliament, 2020). 
The history of Transylvania and Serbia is complicated, political, and even 
controversial. In the next section, I discuss the important distinguishing characteristics of 





Section 2.3.1: Transylvania 
 
Transylvania was historically governed by princes and a Diet. The Diet was an 
administrative body composed of Hungarian nobility, German Saxons, and Szekely 
Hungarians. This group often referred to themselves as the three nations.  This group 
decided on all economic, legal, and military matters even though the majority of the 
population in the area was ethnically Romanian. The Romanians in the area held little 
power; they were mostly peasants that worked under serfdom for Hungarian noblemen. 
As they were not fairly represented by legislative bodies, clashes and protests between 
the Romanians and Hungarians often ensued (Encyclopedia, 2020). 
After Austria defeated the Ottoman Empire in 1684, the Habsburg monarchy 
started to impose their rule in Transylvania. They strengthened the government and 
promoted the Catholic Church. In 1711, the Transylvanian princes were replaced by 
Habsburg governors. In 1765 the Grand Principality of Transylvania was formed. This 
granted Transylvania a special status as an independent state within the Habsburg 
monarchy (Encyclopedia, 2020). This time period, however, was not peaceful; the area 
experienced civil unrest due to competing interests between the large ethnic groups. In 
1784, the Romanians revolted against the Hungarians, demanding political and religious 
equality with other ethnic groups. The rebellion was crushed, and no reforms were made. 
In 1791, the Romanians again demanded religious equality from the Habsburg emperor to 
no avail. In 1848, during the revolutions, the Hungarian parliament proposed the union of 
Transylvania with Hungary.  Romanians were at first optimistic about the union because 
they hoped that it would bring much needed reforms. However, they quickly realized that 
the Hungarians would not support Romanian national interests. A Romanian Diet was 
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formed which requested proportional representation in the Transylvanian Diet along with 
an end to the social and ethnic oppression of Romanians. The Saxons supported the 
Romanians as they also opposed the union with Hungary for fear that they would lose 
their class status in Transylvania. The vote to join Hungary was pushed through 
regardless of the opposition from many groups. This move led to a war within the area 
between the Romanians/Saxons and the Hungarians. The Hungarians were eventually 
defeated but requested that national borders be drawn along ethnic boundaries, giving 
them control of Transylvania. The Austrians declined this request because they favored 
the creation of a Romanian province which would unite Transylvania, Banat, and 
Bukovina (all areas of the Habsburg empire with high concentrations of Romanians). The 
empire at the time was trying to balance civil unrest along ethnic lines with the desire to 
maintain a united empire. They feared that if not supported, the Romanians would also 
desire to separate from the empire. The year following the revolution was characterized 
by many small battles and civil unrest which was eventually quelled by the Austrians. 
After the wars ceased, the Austrians imposed a repressive regime on Hungary and ruled 
Transylvania through a military regime, making German the official language. The 
Austrians acknowledged the Romanian citizens, giving them land to farm but living 
conditions were generally poor (Encyclopedia, 2020). 
The start of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1867 marked the end of autonomy 
for Transylvania and Serbia. As a result of the Ausgleich, Transylvania was no longer 
considered a separate state, it was now a province ruled by the Hungarian Diet. During 
this time, Romanians were oppressed under Magyarization, or the process of Hungarian 
cultural assimilation (Encyclopedia, 2020). However, this time period was not all bad for 
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the Transylvanian region. The Austro-Hungarian empire brought forth infrastructure 
development and the boom of industry in the area.  Prior to 1867, Transylvania did not 
have a rail network. By 1910, rail density in Transylvania was 96 km per 100,000 people. 
This level of development was comparable to the more developed regions of Austria and 
far exceeded the established rail networks on the other side of the border. For reference, 
in Romania rail density averaged around 49 km per 100,000 people at this time (Good, 
1984). These types of projects were financed by two Austrian companies, the 
Staatseisenbahn-Gesellschaft and the Danube Steamship Company. These companies not 
only invested in railways but also waterways and coal mining industries in the Hungarian 
empire. In addition to infrastructure development, banking and capital networks were 
also developed by the late 1860’s. There were six main bank branches throughout the 
empire, one of which was located in Brasov (Transylvania). From 1890-1913, the eastern 
part of the empire experienced an industrial revolution and an emergence of industry. 
This timing was concurrent with the diffusion of the rail and credit network. During this 
time, capitalism spread throughout the eastern regions and Austrian capital financed large 
investments in infrastructure and the expansion of the agriculture and food processing 
industries. Some of the innovation that occurred included the mechanization of farming 
practices as well as the introduction of artificial fertilizers (Good, 1984). After World 
War I and the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the deputies of Transylvanian Romanians 





Section 2.3.2: Serbia 
 
The association of Serbia with the Habsburg empire began during the Great Serb 
Migration, a time when many Serbians fled Ottoman rule and settled into the Habsburg 
Monarchy. During this time, Serbians settled in the lower half of Hungary with a large 
portion also settling in the Vojvodina area of northern Serbia. The Habsburgs provided 
these Serbians special rights, recognizing them as their own nation within the empire, in 
exchange for the provision of a defense against potential invaders, namely the Ottoman 
Empire. In 1716, the Austrian government temporarily forbade settlement in the area by 
Hungarians while allowing German speakers to move in to repopulate the area and 
develop the agricultural sector. During 1848, the area experienced civil unrest between 
the Serbs and the Hungarians. Following the defeat of the Hungarians in 1849, a new 
administrative region called the Voivodeship of Serbia and Banat of Temeschwar was 
formed. This region was an Austrian crown land but was autonomous. In 1860 this was 
abolished, and the region again became a Hungarian crown land at the decision of Franz 
Joseph, the current emperor of Austria-Hungary. As in Transylvania, the region 
experienced great economic growth during empire rule, however ethnic relations were 
tense during this time (Britannica, 2020b). 
 
Section 2.4: Hypotheses 
 
From this discussion, I infer several hypotheses on the lasting effect of the historic 
and cultural ties with the Habsburg empire. The first hypothesis describes the view of the 
empire in Romania and Serbia. I propose that Romanians and Serbians positively view 
their association with the former Habsburg empire and, as an extension, there exists a 
positive relationship between countries that share this affiliation. This stems from the fact 
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that the empire frequently protected both Romanians and Serbians from their oppressors 
while also allowing them to enjoy long periods of autonomy. In addition, the empire 
promoted the development of fair and well-functioning institutions while also investing 
heavily in infrastructure. This led to great economic growth in these former empire 
territories. Even though periods of time were characterized by ethnic clashes, the length 
of independence should outweigh any short-term negative associations with the empire 
that may have occurred.  For these reasons, I expect to find a greater number of 
investments from countries affiliated with the empire in former Habsburg territories. The 
best identification of the effect of culture on FDI comes from local variations in culture 
which should be localized to the former empire border.   
The second hypothesis builds on the first by proposing that some historical ties 
may be stronger than others. Throughout history, Romanians and Serbians were often 
oppressed by the Hungarians and as a result often engaged in battles over territories. 
Pockets of Romania and Serbia still have significant Hungarian minority populations. In 
Romania specifically, cultural and political tensions between Romanians and Hungarians 
still exist. It is possible that Hungarian investors would be more drawn to areas with large 
Hungarian populations due to language and cultural similarities. Since Austrian capital 
financed most of the infrastructure and industry development in the former empire 
territories, I propose that Austrians formed the strongest ties in these areas. 
 
Section 2.5: Data 
 
The primary data used in the analysis come from fDi Markets, a database 
maintained by the Financial Times, which tracks cross-border greenfield investments 
from 2003 to 2018. This database is unique in that it identifies many details about each 
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investment project. It provides the source and location of each investment, in most cases 
down to the city level. It also provides the industry of each investment project as well as 
the size of the investment as measured by the amount of capital invested and the number 
of jobs created. From 2003-2018, there were a total of 2,221 projects identified in 217 
cities in Romania and 910 projects identified in 115 Serbian cities. Estimation of the 
model requires the precise location of each city. I use GeoNames to obtain the geographic 
coordinates and the population of each city in the data set. In addition to the cities with 
investment projects, I also include cities in Romania and Serbia that did not receive any 
foreign investment to avoid any selection issues. I include all cities in Romania and 
Serbia that are considered seats of administrative divisions. In addition to these cities, I 
also include all populated places with 5,000 or more individuals. The average population 
of cities with foreign investments is 6,113. I choose to include all populated places with 
populations above 5,000 individuals in order to capture all similarly sized cities that may 
have also been considered for investment. This results in a total of 3,018 cities in 
Romania and 157 cities in Serbia, for a total of 3,175 cities in my sample. After obtaining 
the city coordinates, I used ArcGIS software to map the cities, the current country 
borders, and the historical empire border. I use this software to calculate the geodesic 
distance from each city to the nearest point on the former empire border in kilometers. 
The analysis is performed at the city level. To form the dependent variable, I 
construct a measure of FDI per capita2. To do this, I calculate the number of “Habsburg” 
 
2 Another specification that was considered is the value of FDI coming from Habsburg 
investors. This method was ultimately not chosen as the amount of capital invested and 
the number of jobs created with each investment project are highly correlated with the 
industry of the investment. To my knowledge, there are no theories which suggest that 
foreign investors invest more capital in an area because these investors share a cultural 
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projects in city i, from 2003-2018. This measure is then scaled per 10,000 individuals as 
this corresponds to the average population of the cities in my sample. I define a Habsburg 
project as any investment coming from Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Croatia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina. These countries were selected since they were 
completely contained within the boundaries of the Habsburg empire from 1867-1918, the 
period of time that regions of Romania and Serbia also officially belonged to the empire. 
The analysis also requires data on location-specific characteristics that may 
impact the allocation of foreign direct investment. Ideally, these data would be available 
at the city level; however, this is not readily available for every location in my data set. 
The smallest statistical unit for which I can collect data is the municipal or district level. 
In the European Union, each member country is divided into various regions for 
statistical purposes. This classification system is called the Nomenclature of Territorial 
Units for Statistics, or NUTS for short. Eurostat specifies three NUTS levels in each 
country. These levels are based on existing institutional divisions within each country as 
well as on certain population thresholds. The largest classification is NUTS1 and the 
smallest classification for which data is collected is NUTS3. The average population of 
the NUTS3 division is between 150,000 to 800,000 individuals. All Romanian data on 
economic and demographic characteristics are obtained from Eurostat at the NUTS3 level 
as of 2016, the most recently published Romanian data. Serbia is not in the European 
Union; however, it is a candidate country and therefore is in the process of transitioning 
to the NUTS classification system for data collection. The smallest administrative unit in 
 
tie. This paper explores the theory that certain countries share a tie and therefore this tie 
increases the probability of investment in a given region. This effect would be captured 
by the count rather than the value of FDI.   
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Serbia is a district. Serbia currently has 24 districts that are proposed to be equivalent to 
the NUTS3 classification. All Serbian data come from a report on the municipalities and 
regions of Serbia published by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. I draw on 
data from the 2017 publication of this report which provides information for Serbian 
districts as of 2016. 
In Romania, the location characteristics considered are land area measured in 
square kilometers and the following population characteristics: population density per 
square kilometer, median age, and GDP per capita. I also include information on total 
employment, and employment by industry. The industries considered are manufacturing, 
IT, and agriculture. Since educational characteristics are not available at the NUTS3 
level, I also include information on the total number of professional, scientific, or 
technical establishments and the number of EU trademark applications in an effort to 
capture human capital differences across regions. 
I obtain similar regional, economic, and demographic characteristics for Serbia. 
For Serbia, I examine statistics on land area measured in square kilometers, as well as the 
following population characteristics: population density per square kilometer, average 
age, average net salary per employee, as well as the average annual number of workers 
employed in various industries. The industries included are agriculture, manufacturing, 
finance and insurance, and real estate. These data serve to establish the industrial profile 






Section 2.6: Identifying the Effect of Culture on the Allocation of FDI 
 
In this study I implement a spatial regression discontinuity design to test whether 
there is a discontinuous increase in Habsburg investment at the former empire border in 
present day Romania and Serbia. This method allows an identification of within country 
variation in the allocation of FDI that can be directly attributed to cultural and historical 
differences. The former empire had a boundary which split present day Romania and 
Serbia in half. I present evidence that this empire affiliation had persistent cultural effects 
on the people living in these former empire regions. Perhaps the most important cultural 
effect is the formation of historical business ties among countries sharing an affiliation 
with the former Habsburg empire. I take advantage of this variation in culture along the 
former boundary, to identify differences in the location of FDI at the border. Cities on 
either side of this boundary share a common language and religion. Additionally, cities 
located on either side of this border have shared common institutions for over 100 years. 
These features allow me to separate the effect of culture from the effect of institutions, 
language, and religion which are often entangled in other definitions of culture used in 
previous studies examining the effect of culture on FDI. I follow the literature in 
implementing a one-dimensional forcing variable, distance to the former empire border in 
kilometers. In order to estimate how culture impacts FDI at the former empire border, I 
estimate the following equation: 
 
!"#!"#$#%&'! =	&( +	&)()*+,-* + .("*) + ()*+,-.("*) +	1+ + 2* 
 
where !"#!"#$#%&'! 	represents the number of Habsburg projects per 10,000 individuals 
in city i. ()*+,-* is a dummy variable which is equal to one if city i is located within a 
region that formerly belonged to the Habsburg empire. "* represents the distance from 
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city i to the historical border measured in kilometers.	1+ represents location country fixed 
effects which control for any country-specific factors, such as formal institutions, 
language, and religion which could all impact the allocation of FDI today.  
I present two estimations of this model. In the first estimation, I present results 
from a local linear approach where .("*) = "*. In this estimation, I follow the literature 
and use an optimal bandwidth of 84.84 kilometers, as determined by the methodology 
proposed by Calonico et al., (2014). In the second estimation of the model, I include 
various orders of polynomials of the distance variable as controls which is captured by 
.("*). The coefficient of interest in all of these estimations is &),  which reflects the role 
of Habsburg culture on FDI. 
This empirical analysis requires several important assumptions. The first 
assumption is that if Habsburg investment is an important determinant of FDI, there 
should exist a discontinuity, or a jump, in foreign investment coming from former 
Habsburg investors as one moves into the former Habsburg territory. The second 
assumption is that foreign investment coming from the rest of the world does not change 
discontinuously at the border. This is an important feature because if foreign investment 
coming from the rest of the world also jumps at this border, it is likely that these regions 
provide better business environments for foreign investors. In order to attribute the 
change in investment patterns to culture, it must be the case that only Habsburg 
investment is impacted at the former empire border.  The final necessary assumption is 
that any other factor that may impact the spatial allocation of foreign investment is 
continuous at this border. If these assumptions hold, it is reasonable to conclude that any 
increase in Habsburg FDI at the border can be attributed to a Habsburg cultural effect.  
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To test these assumptions, I create a similar measure of FDI per capita by calculating the 
number of “Rest of the World” investments in city i, from 2003-2018. This measure is 
also scaled per 10,000 individuals for consistency. I replace the dependent variable in 
equation 1 with !"#,-.! 	to formally test the first assumption. I repeat this process with 
each of the location characteristics collected to test the validity of the final assumption. 
 
Section 2.5.1: Graphical Analysis 
 
Before presenting the results from the regression model, it is important to 
examine the distribution of Habsburg investment near the border. Figure 2.1 presents the 
density of investment projects in Romania and Serbia. Figure 2.1 (a) depicts projects 
from Empire investors. While there are clearly some investments that are being drawn to 
the capital city of Bucharest, it appears that Habsburg investments are almost completely 
contained within the former empire territory. Figure 2.1 (b) provides the density of 
projects from the rest of the world. In contrast to previous results, there is no clear pattern 
for these investors. These investors appear to be geographically distributed throughout 
both countries, with the largest cities drawing more investments. Figure 2.2 plots the 
location of Habsburg and ROW investments respectively, with larger circles representing 
a larger number of projects per capita. These figures present similar evidence for 
Habsburg investors. Empire investment projects occur almost exclusively in former 
empire territories while ROW projects are more or less evenly distributed throughout 
Romania and Serbia. 
Next, I present the graphical evidence of a discontinuity. Figure 2.3 (a) plots the 
average number of Empire FDI projects per 10,000 individuals over various distances 
from the border. The horizontal axis indicates the distance in kilometers from the empire 
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border. Positive values represent the distance from the border to cities within the former 
empire territory, while negative values represent the distance from the border to cities 
that were never in the empire. While the average number of Habsburg FDI projects is 
relatively low across Romania and Serbia, there is a striking jump in the average number 
of Habsburg projects that is only evident within 100 kilometers of the border in the 
former empire territory. Figure 2.3 (b) plots the average number of ROW projects per 
10,000 individuals over various distances from the border. In contrast to the previous 
figure, there is no evidence of a discontinuity in projects from the rest of the world. ROW 
investments are flat across the former empire border. The only spikes in ROW projects 
seem to correspond with larger cities that fall on either side of the border. This establishes 
the fact that Habsburg investors are being drawn to the former empire territories of 
Romania and Serbia. Since this pattern does not exist for investors from the rest of the 
world, these graphs provide initial evidence that the discontinuity found is not solely 
indicative of a better business environment for all foreign investors. 
A valid regression discontinuity design requires that all other factors that may 
impact the spatial allocation of FDI in both Romania and Serbia remain continuous 
across the former empire border. I present graphical evidence of this by country as these 
statistics are drawn from different sources for Romania and Serbia. The statistics 
presented are as of 2016, the most current year available for both countries. 
When examining the factors that may impact the allocation of FDI in Romania, it 
is evident that most demographic and industry characteristics are continuous across the 
border. Demographic characteristics such as median age, population density, and GDP 
per capita are continuous, which indicates that there are no significant human capital 
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differences across regions. While it would be preferable to have data on the educational 
characteristics of the population in these areas, these data are not available. More 
compelling evidence of this is reflected in the graphs depicting the number of EU 
trademark applications, IT employment, and the number of professional, scientific, or 
technical establishments. Each of these graphs provide evidence that no trend or 
discontinuity exist across the former empire border, suggesting that the educational 
characteristics of the individuals living in these areas do not differ significantly. There are 
two important industrial characteristics to note. First, there is an observable trend in 
manufacturing employment across the border. Second, there is a significant difference in 
agricultural employment across the border. These differences in the industrial 
characteristics of the regions could be persistent effects of the Habsburg empire 
affiliation. Under Habsburg rule, the empire invested heavily in the development of 
industry and infrastructure, especially in the eastern portions of the empire. Towards the 
end of the 19th century, the Transylvanian area no longer focused on agricultural 
production but instead focused on producing timber and iron (Good, 1984). The 
affiliation with the Habsburg empire, may have propelled the former empire territory 
towards other industries while the non-empire territory may have lagged behind.  
Interestingly, differences in economic development as captured by the GDP per 
capita and other measures of the industrial employment of individuals living in these 
areas, do not persist. These are important findings; however, these factors still do not 
explain the discontinuity observed in the number of Habsburg projects. The top industries 
of investment for Habsburg investors are real estate and financial services. This means 
that the trends in manufacturing and agricultural employment alone cannot explain the 
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pattern of Habsburg investment. While agricultural employment is significantly lower in 
the former Habsburg territory, this factor does not seem to affect the allocation of FDI 
from the rest of the world, as there is no difference in the amount of FDI coming from the 
rest of the world across this border. This suggests that Habsburg investors are being 
drawn to areas where they hold cultural and historic business ties. 
In Serbia, the capital city of Belgrade falls on the former Habsburg empire 
boundary. In addition, five large cities fall within 5 kilometers of this border. It is likely 
that some investors may choose to locate in these cities in order to be in close proximity 
to Belgrade. In order to prevent these large cities from skewing the results, I drop them 
from the main analysis. Figure 2.5 depicts the factors that may influence the spatial 
allocation of FDI in Serbia, excluding Belgrade and the five large cities that were 
dropped from the analysis. 
The graphs depicting Serbian characteristics present a similar story to that of 
Romania. In Serbia, there is a statistically significant difference in manufacturing and 
agricultural employment across the former empire border. This again indicates some 
evidence of the Habsburg influence on the industrial development of the region. While 
these graphs depict evidence of a few discontinuities in the economic and demographic 
characteristics of the regions of Serbia across the empire border, none of these 
characteristics explain why Habsburg projects per capita are higher in the former empire 
region of Serbia. As in Romania, the main industries that empire investors are associated 
with are service industries; primarily real estate and financial services. Investors from the 
rest of the world are also associated with service industries but they also invest in the 
automotive and manufacturing industries. Yet, even these investors are equally likely to 
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invest along either side of the border. Furthermore, when including all cities except for 
Belgrade in the analysis, there is no evidence of a discontinuity in any of the 
characteristics that may affect the allocation of FDI in Serbia, which provides a further 
indication that any effect captured by the model can be attributed to a Habsburg cultural 
impact.  These additional graphs are included in the appendix for additional robustness.  
 
Section 2.7: Results from the Regression Discontinuity Models 
 
The main results of this analysis come from estimations including all cities in 
Romania and Serbia with populations of at least 5,000 individuals. It is important to 
include all possible cities that could have been selected by foreign investors to avoid any 
selection bias. However, once accounting for these additional cities, the sample size 
increases from 326 cities to 3,175 cities. For this reason, it is important to verify that the 
main results obtained from the model are not solely being driven by an increasing sample 
size. Before presenting the main results of the analysis using the full data set, I present 
the results for the subset of the data that features only the cities that were selected for 
investment. Table 2.1 presents these results. The results indicate that there are between 
1.2 and 1.5 additional empire projects per 10,000 individuals at the former empire border. 
These results are robust even when including the five cities surrounding Belgrade. 
Results from an estimation including these five cities are presented in the appendix. 
Table 2.2 reports the main estimation results of the analysis using equation 1 and 
!"#!"#$#%&'! 	 as the dependent variable. In this table, I only report the estimate of &), the 
coefficient on the empire indicator variable, which measures the empire treatment effect 
that I capture with the spatial regression discontinuity design. The treatment effect 
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captured is the estimated discontinuity in empire investments at the border. Each column 
in the table represents a separate estimation of the same equation. In the first three 
columns, I present results using the full sample and various orders of polynomials of the 
distance to the border as control variables. The fourth column presents the results from a 
local linear approximation of the equation with a bandwidth of 84.84 kilometers on either 
side of the border. This optimal bandwidth is obtained using the methodology proposed 
by Calonico et al., (2014). 
All model estimates show statistically significant results that show direct evidence 
of a sharp increase in empire projects per 10,000 individuals at the border. The magnitude 
of this increase ranges from 0.24 to 0.32 additional empire investments per 10,000 
individuals. This is robust to various specifications of the model and various bandwidths. 
In Table 2.3, I present results from estimations of the model including a second order 
polynomial of distance as a control over various bandwidths. These bandwidths range 
from the full sample size of approximately 200 kilometers, to 42 kilometers from the 
former Habsburg border. Only in the narrowest bandwidth of 42 kilometers does the 
estimate lose its significance. All other results presented are statistically significant at the 
5 percent level and are stable, with around 0.3 additional Habsburg investments per 
10,000 individuals. In Table 2.4, I present the results from a local linear approximation of 
the model again using the same range of bandwidths. In this estimation, the results are 
again stable and statistically significant, even using the narrowest bandwidth. These 
tables provide evidence that the main results of the model are not sensitive to bandwidth 




Section 2.8: Alternative Specifications of the Model 
 
Throughout Habsburg rule, Romanians and Serbians often engaged in disputes 
with their Hungarian neighbors. The regions of Romania and Serbia formerly belonging 
to the Habsburg empire still maintain large Hungarian populations. However, the 
relations of Romanians and Serbians with these groups are still strained. In Romania, the 
large Hungarian groups of Transylvania still demand their independence. For this reason, 
it is important to check that the discontinuity in Habsburg investment is not solely being 
driven by Hungarian investors that are locating in regions where Hungarian is spoken. 
Figure 2.6 (a) shows the average number of FDI projects made by Hungarian investors 
per 10,000 individuals. In this figure, there is no evidence of a discontinuity at the 
Habsburg border. This is an important finding because it suggests that the main results of 
the model are not solely driven by Hungarian investment. Interestingly, there is evidence 
that investment gradually increases in the former empire territory, especially as distance 
from the border increases. This indicates that Hungarian investors may be locating in 
regions that are primarily Hungarian. Since the average number of Hungarian projects 
increases with distance from the empire border, it is likely that Hungarian investors are 
locating in cities that are closer to the border with Hungary. This is consistent with my 
second hypothesis. Due to potential negative associations that Romanians and Serbians 
may hold for Hungarians, Hungarian investors may choose to locate in areas that are 
predominantly Hungarian, where such investments may be viewed more positively by the 
local community. Figure 2.6 (b) shows the average number of FDI projects per 10,000 
individuals from all Habsburg investors excluding Hungary. Even after excluding the 
Hungarian investors, there is clear evidence of a discontinuity at the Habsburg border. In 
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fact, the graph looks almost identical to the graph using the main investment group. This 
reinforces the fact that the results are capturing evidence of a Habsburg cultural effect. 
Throughout the history of the empire, Austria served as the heart of the Habsburg 
empire. Historically, Austrian leaders managed the transition to Habsburg rule, and it was 
Austrian capital that invested in infrastructure development and the development of 
industry in the Eastern regions of the empire. For these reasons, it is likely that Austrians 
formed stronger historic business relationships in former Habsburg territories than other 
former Habsburg members. To test this hypothesis, I examine the effect of the Habsburg 
border on the number of Austrian investments per 10,000 individuals.  Table 2.5 presents 
the results from the two specifications of the model considered in the main analysis. The 
results are statistically significant for the local linear and second order polynomial 
estimation of the model, with estimates of approximately 0.09 additional Austrian 
investments per 10,000 individuals at the border. While the estimates lose some precision 
when incorporating higher orders of polynomials, this specification of the model suggests 
that Austrian investors hold important historical and cultural ties to communities in the 
former empire regions of Romania and Serbia. 
 
Section 2.9: Robustness Checks 
 
In this section, I consider two additional robustness checks. In the first check, I 
include a set of border fixed effects for the main analysis. To implement this approach, I 
divide the former Habsburg border into 15 equal segments. When calculating the distance 
from each city to the border, I identify the segment of the border that each city in the 
sample is closest to. I choose to include these controls in the analysis in order to control 
for varying regional characteristics along the historical border. For example, in Romania, 
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some regions along the border in the former Habsburg territory, have large groups of 
Hungarian speakers. Additionally, in Serbia, the capital city of Belgrade falls on the 
border of the former Habsburg empire. While Belgrade and five other neighboring cities 
are removed from the main analysis, the estimates could still be capturing some 
agglomeration effects in the region. I present the results controlling for these factors in 
Table 2.6. The estimate remains statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level 
across all specifications of the model. The estimate is stable ranging from approximately 
0.24 to 0.32 additional Habsburg investments per 10,000 individuals. 
In the final robustness check, I manipulate the location of the Habsburg border to 
verify whether any other discontinuities exist in the data. If the initial estimate obtained is 
solely a “Habsburg” effect, there should not be any discontinuity associated with any 
other “false border”. To test this assumption, I check for evidence of a discontinuity using 
false borders located in 25-kilometer increments from the true Habsburg boundary. I find 
no evidence of a discontinuity on either side of the true border, further indicating that the 
effect uncovered in the analysis can be attributed to a “Habsburg” cultural effect. The 
results from this analysis are summarized in Table 2.7. 
While these robustness checks provide evidence that the main results are not 
being driven by other measurable factors, future research should investigate other data 
sources to improve the model. The model could benefit from the addition of better 
demographic characteristics including educational profiles of the regions as well as 
language and other cultural characteristics. The language characteristics would be 
especially important in proving that empire investors are not only being drawn to 
territories where a higher proportion of the population speaks a common language. It is 
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well known that that the former empire territories in Romania and Serbia still contain 
large Hungarian groups, however, without good regional data on the languages spoken in 
these areas, it is difficult to verify whether there is a jump in the number of people 
speaking Hungarian at this former empire border. It is also important to evaluate whether 
there exists a jump in the number of people speaking German at this border. Additionally, 
it would be interesting to test this same effect at the current country border. This would 
allow me to verify the size of the impact relative to the impact found in this study. 
Similarly, it would also be interesting to perform the analysis using a larger sample size 
and additional countries. The former Habsburg border ran through several other present 
day countries including Poland and the Ukraine. Future research should also further 
investigate the industrial composition of the region and the investors. It would be 
interesting to examine the patterns of investment by industry and nationality of the 
investor to determine whether agglomeration characteristics matter for all types of 
investors. 
 
Section 2.10: Conclusion 
 
This paper demonstrates that previous Habsburg empire affiliation impacted the 
allocation of FDI in the former empire territories of Romania and Serbia today. 
Comparing the number of foreign investment projects in cities on either side of the long-
gone Habsburg border, I find a higher number of investments, originating from countries 
that were also historically affiliated with the Habsburg empire, in former empire 
territories. I argue that this difference in investment along the former empire border can 
be attributed to persistent cultural ties formed through historic business relationships. The 
Habsburg empire made several important contributions to the development of the eastern 
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portions of the empire. Perhaps the most important contributions they made were in the 
development of infrastructure and industry which I argue led to the development of a 
historical business relationship that persisted over time. 
Using a geographic regression discontinuity design, I present evidence of a sharp 
increase in the number of Habsburg investments along the former empire border. 
Specifically, I find an increase of 0.24 to 0.32 additional Habsburg investments per 
10,000 individuals in former empire territories. This study provides a unique setting in 
which to examine the impact of cultural ties since the former Habsburg empire had a 
border which ran through several present-day countries, including Romania and Serbia. 
This feature allows me to measure the effect of within country variation in culture on 
FDI. Since cities on either side of the border have shared formal institutions for over 100 
years, this methodology allows me to separate a cultural impact of empire affiliation on 
FDI that cannot be explained by differing institutions. Through the analysis, I present 
evidence that the number of investment projects from the rest of the world do not change 
across this border indicating that the former empire territories of Romania and Serbia are 
not simply offering better business environments for foreign investors. In examining 
other demographic and industrial characteristics of the regions in the analysis, I find only 
a few discontinuities in the industrial composition of the territories. These discontinuities 
are in manufacturing and agricultural employment. The former empire territories have 
stronger manufacturing sectors and lower agricultural employment today. However, it is 
unlikely that the industrial composition is driving the main results. The top industries of 
investment for Habsburg investors are service industries, primarily real estate and 
financial services. As investors from the rest of the world are also primarily investing in 
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services, industrial composition alone cannot explain the results of the model. While 
Romania and Serbia still have large populations of Hungarians throughout the former 
empire territories, the effect found is not attributed to Hungarian investors locating in 
Hungarian communities. The main results of the model are robust to the exclusion of the 
Hungarian group. In fact, I find no discontinuity across the former empire border for 
Hungarian investors. Rather, I present evidence of Hungarian investment increasing in 
the former empire territory and increasing in distance, suggesting that Hungarian 
investors are locating in areas that contain more Hungarians and in areas that are most 
likely closer to the border with Hungary. Furthermore, I show that a discontinuity still 
exists when considering only Austrian investors. This is in line with the main hypothesis 
of the model, since Austrians were most likely to develop the strongest cultural business 
ties in the area. The main findings of the model are robust to various specifications of the 
model including using various bandwidths and border fixed effects. Even more 
compelling, the results are robust to a falsification test using placebo borders located in 
25-kilometer increments from the true border. In this test, only the true border provides 
statistically significant results for the estimate of the increase in Habsburg investment 
projects at the former empire border. 
It is widely recognized in both the economics and international business literature 
that culture can impact the allocation of FDI. Culture can not only impact the location 
choice of a foreign investor, but it can also impact the long-term profitability of the 
foreign firm in the new country. While these implications are presumed, it has been 
difficult to formally test these assumptions since culture is inherently difficult to measure. 
Previous research attempts to measure culture through institutions, language, religion, or 
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the Hofstede index, however, these characteristics are typically measured at the country 
level, making it difficult to disentangle the effect found from any other characteristic that 
also varies at the national level. By measuring culture through a historic empire 
affiliation, I provide evidence of the impact that cultural ties can have on FDI that is 




Table 2.1: Empire Effect on Empire Investments for Selected Cities 
      
 





Table 2.2: Empire Effect on Empire Investments 






Table 2.3: Polynomial Models over Various Bandwidths 
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Table 2.5: Empire Effect on Austrian Investments  






Table 2.6: Robustness Check for Empire Effect on Empire Investment 
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THE KIA EFFECT: THE IMPACT OF FDI IN RURAL AMERICA 
Section 3.1: Introduction 
 
Rural U.S. counties have long lagged behind their urban counterparts. Rural areas 
are on average much less educated and have higher unemployment and poverty rates. The 
areas have different industrial compositions (USDA, 2020). The economic growth that 
rural areas experience is highly dependent on their industrial compositions. In general, 
these areas rely on agriculture, mining and fracking, and manufacturing. When these 
industries are affected by economic fluctuations, the residents’ incomes and employment 
fluctuate as well. Over time many rural areas have experienced declining population 
rates. Many counties have older populations and are experiencing brain drain with the 
youngest, most educated residents migrating to urbanized areas for better opportunities 
(Kopparam, 2020). Economists often credit the rural-urban divide to agglomeration 
effects. Urban areas typically experience stronger growth because they have access to 
better infrastructure, including airports, highways, and public transportation, as well as a 
large pool of consumers and highly educated workers. These factors work together to 
raise productivity. Urban agglomeration advantages allow them to recover faster after 
recessions.  Recent data show, however, that some rural areas had still not recovered 




Many federal and local development programs target rural areas in an attempt to 
address the urban-rural development gap. Federal programs aimed at assisting rural areas 
have had varying levels of success. An alternative to federal funding at the state and local 
level is to focus business development on the attraction of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Local communities around the United States compete vigorously to obtain foreign 
direct investment projects with the hope that once a new business establishes its 
operations, economic development will soon follow.   
While foreign firms are typically much less likely to select rural areas, it is 
important to understand what happens to these local economies when they do. The 
purpose of this paper is to assess the extent to which FDI projects may have an impact on 
rural economic development. According to data obtained from fDi Markets, rural 
counties only attract a small share of FDI. Only 7 percent of all investment projects locate 
in rural areas. Even so, the average capital investment value of FDI projects in rural areas 
is 64.5 million dollars, which is 89 percent higher than the average amount of FDI going 
to urban areas. The average number of jobs created by foreign investors in rural areas is 
also higher. Rural areas receive an average of 108 jobs per project while urban areas 
receive 86. It should also be noted that rural areas in southern states attract more FDI than 
other parts of the country. The investment is primarily concentrated in manufacturing, 
with the automotive sector accounting ofr the largest number of projects (SelectUSA, 
2018).  
Given that many state and local governments use tax and other incentives to 
attract FDI, an analysis of the local economic effects is warranted to help understand 
whether such investments pay off in the long run. Yet, analyzing the effects of the 
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investments presents challenges. While it is possible to observe economic growth 
following an investment, it is difficult to determine how much of that would have 
occurred without the investment (O’Keefe, 2004, Pender and Reeder, 2011). Some areas 
may have experienced faster growth regardless of the investment received. Since the 
investment itself is not random, this makes estimating such an effect even more difficult. 
In this paper, I use a quasi-experimental approach in which treatment areas are matched 
to control areas that are similar in observed pretreatment characteristics that are believed 
to affect both the probability of treatment and the outcomes examined. This method of 
carefully matching treatment and control groups mimics a randomized experiment as 
closely as possible. As long as a suitable match can be found, this method has the 
capability of producing a valid estimate of the investment impact (Pender and Reeder, 
2011).  
Combined with propensity score matching, results from a difference-in-difference 
estimation shows no measurable effect of foreign direct investment on per capita personal 
income or employment growth in rural counties. The analysis reveals that rural counties 
receiving FDI are already growing faster than rural counties without such investments. 
The new investments do not appear to further influence these effects.  
When examining the effect of FDI in one specific county, the results reveal a 
similar pattern. Troup County, Georgia received one of the largest investments when Kia 
established its operations in 2006. From a site location perspective, the choice was 
unusual. Troup County had few supply chain linkages for such a large investor. As a 
requirement to establish operations, the deal included provisions for several suppliers to 
also establish their operations in the area. In comparison to its closest match of St. Joseph 
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County, Michigan, the impact study reveals that Troup experienced employment growth 
and nonfarm personal income growth. However, there are no such effects for per capita 
personal income growth. In fact, St. Joseph County experienced faster per capita income 
growth from 2006-2018 without foreign direct investment projects. Part of the reason for 
this growth could be because St. Joseph County had greater linkages with urbanized areas 
as well as a higher share of manufacturing activity. These agglomeration factors may 
have allowed the county to sustain its economic growth over time.  
This paper is among the first to analyze the effects of FDI in the United States at 
the county level. By combining propensity score matching with a difference-in-difference 
approach, I am able to ensure the model relies on a proper control group to provide 
reliable estimates. The case study, examining the impact of the Kia investment in 
Georgia, further supports the evaluation of FDI in rural counties. The analysis shows that 
a simple or narrowly focused development strategy for all rural areas does not raise 
economic growth. Rural development strategy must take into account the underlying 
economic characteristics of each area. State and local investment programs should target 
and support the existing industrial clusters, not just seek to attract new projects, whether 
through FDI or domestic investment.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 places this work in the context of 
the growth and impact analysis literature. Section 3.3 describes the data, while Section 
3.4 introduces the methodology. Section 3.5 presents the results from the propensity 
score match and the difference in difference analysis. Section 3.6 presents the results 
from a quasi-experimental approach used to analyze the impact of the Kia investment in 
Troup County. Section 3.7 takes these results one step further by implementing an 
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IMPLAN analysis to assess the impact of the investment in the local community. This 
section also considers the impact that the Kia investment may have incurred if it located 
in St. Joseph County, Michigan. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes.  
 
Section 3.2: Literature Review 
 
Communities around the world often target FDI for its welfare enhancing 
capabilities. These perceived benefits include the adoption of foreign best practices and 
technologies as well as linkages between foreign and domestic firms (Alfaro et al., 2006). 
While these beliefs are particularly strong among business leaders, the evidence on the 
growth enhancing effects of FDI is limited. The empirical literature finds mixed results 
for the effect of FDI on economic growth.  
Many of the previous studies conducted consist of macro level analyses at the 
country level. These types of studies find positive and significant effects of FDI on 
economic growth for developed economies while finding weak or no effect for 
developing economies. Even when the growth enhancing effects are not limited to 
developed economies, the gains that developed economies realize are much larger than 
those of developing countries (Carbonell and Werner, 2018). The literature attributes this 
to a necessary link between human capital and the growth enhancing effects of FDI. 
Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) suggest that FDI enables growth through 
technology diffusion. Hermes and Lensink (2003) find that countries require a certain 
level of capital in order to take advantage of the benefits of FDI. They uncover that a 
positive effect can only be realized if domestic financial markets are sufficiently 
developed. Similarly, Carkovic and Levine (2005) find that the effect of FDI depends on 
the level of human capital, domestic financial markets, and the initial level of income of 
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the host economy. Among studies that find little to no effect of FDI in aggregate terms, 
the authors discover varying effects among countries by income levels. De Mello (1997) 
shows that FDI has a positive effect on OECD countries and a negative effect on non-
OECD countries. Baiashvili and Gattini (2019) find that economic growth exhibits an 
inverted u-shape when countries are separated by income level. Low- and high-income 
countries experience little to no growth in response to FDI while middle income countries 
exhibit the most growth following foreign investment. Alvarado et al. (2017) find no 
effect of FDI on economic growth in the aggregate for Latin American countries. When 
separating countries by income level, they reveal that high-income countries experience 
the highest growth, while middle income countries experience insignificant growth. Low 
income countries experience negative effects of FDI on growth. Accordingly, it follows 
that the United States should benefit from FDI due to its highly industrialized nature and 
its highly educated workforce. To my knowledge, no previous study evaluates the effect 
of FDI on economic growth within the United States; especially analyzing the effect of 
FDI in rural areas. Thus, this paper will build upon the current literature to provide an 
understanding of these effects at the county level.  
This paper is also related to a strand of literature that examines the effect of 
various rural development initiatives on economic growth. The seminal Isserman and 
Rephann (1995) paper provides a first attempt at empirically analyzing the effect of the 
Appalachian Regional Commission and its funding on promoting economic development. 
This planning commission was established in order to support the economic growth of 
the Appalachian region. The main contribution of the commission was the provision of 
funding for infrastructure, hospitals, and educational facilities. In this paper, the authors 
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compare Appalachian counties that received funding to their nearest twins; a group of 
control counties that are similar across various characteristics but never received funding. 
The authors find that Appalachian counties grew faster than their twins in all 20 variables 
that were tested. Specifically, they show that Appalachian counties grew 48 percent more 
in income, 5 percent more in population, and 17 percent more in per capita income.  
More recent papers build on this empirical methodology and apply the approach 
to different programs. O’Keefe (2004) examines the impact of California’s enterprise 
zone program on employment and wage growth at the census tract level. In the analysis, 
census tracts which receive the EZ designation are matched to non-EZ-census tracts using 
propensity score matching. Results suggest that EZ census tracts experience employment 
growth at a rate of 3 percent per year during the first six years following the designation; 
however, this result does not persist in later years, even becoming negative over time. 
The author attributes this to the limited nature of the program. EZ designations only last 
for 15 years with the potential of a 5-year extension, making it more attractive for 
employers earlier in the designation. 
A recent paper by Pender and Reeder (2011) examines the effect of the Delta 
Regional Authority on rural development from 2002 to 2007. To evaluate the impact of 
the funding, the authors match economically distressed counties which receive DRA 
funding to similar rural counties in the region using propensity score matching. They 
combine this methodology with a difference-in-difference approach and find that per 
capita personal income, along with its components, grew more rapidly in DRA counties. 
Additionally, these impacts were higher in counties with higher funding levels. This 
paper draws on this methodology to assess how FDI has affected the growth trajectories 
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of rural areas in the United States. While FDI is not necessarily a rural development 
policy, FDI has often been promoted as an important focus of development efforts. 
Understanding the economic effects of FDI in local communities is an important step in 
determining the effectiveness of policies designed to attract FDI to rural areas.  
 
Section 3.3: Data 
 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) classifies counties as either 
metropolitan or non-metropolitan for research purposes. One classification scheme that is 
often used is the Rural-Urban Continuum Code. This code builds upon the official metro 
and nonmetro designations determined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
by further separating counties into three levels of metro development and six levels of 
nonmetro development. All counties are ranked on a scale of one to nine, with scores of 
1-3 representing urban counties and scores of 4-9 representing rural/nonmetro counties. 
These county codes are updated every ten years. I use the 2003 Rural-Urban Continuum 
Code to select my sample of rural counties, which includes all counties with scores of 4 
or higher. Using the fDi Markets database, I identify all rural counties with at least one 
foreign investment project between 2005 and 2015 as a “treated” county. All other 
counties which receive foreign investments before or after this period are eliminated from 
the study. I then build a demographic and industry profile for all rural counties in order to 
match each treated rural county with a proper control county for the study period.  
In order to find a proper match for each county, I employ a propensity score 
matching model. The propensity score is the conditional probability that a given rural 
county will receive FDI, given the industry and demographic profile of each rural county 
in the year 2000. The probability that a county will receive FDI is modeled as a function 
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of these characteristics using a logit regression (O’Keefe, 2004). The logit model 
estimates the probability of each county ever receiving FDI and it takes the following 
form:  
Pr($%&'()* = 1) = &
!!"
1 + &!!"	 
$%&'()* = 1 if the county received any investment projects between the years 2005-
2015, and it is zero otherwise. The selection of an area by a foreign investor depends 
directly on the needs of each investor as well as the industrial and demographic profile of 
each county. X is a matrix of these characteristics. Based on a review of the literature, I 
consider the following factors important determinants of foreign multinational location 
choices:  
• population in the year 2000 (USDA) 
• unemployment rate in the year 2000 (USDA) 
• poverty rate in the year 2000 (Census Data) 
• percent of the population commuting to a nearby county in the year 2003 
(USDA) 
• share of workers employed in the manufacturing industry in the year 2000 
(QCEW- BLS) 
• total count of all establishments in the year 2000 (QCEW- BLS) 
• share of the Black and Asian populations in the year 2000 
• share of the population between the ages of 25-50 in the year 2000 
 
Each “treated” rural county is then matched to a “control” rural county with the 
closest propensity score, using a variety of matching methods to ensure common support 
(Pender and Reeder, 2011). This model takes into account the actual characteristics of 
each rural county in order to estimate the probability of ever receiving FDI. While no 
county will have a “perfect” match, the propensity score estimates the probability that a 
county will receive FDI based on the characteristics of counties that actually receive 
investment projects. Table 3.1 presents the results for the logit regression. Additional data 
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for the dependent variables, personal income per capita and total employment, come from 
the BEA.  
Table 3.1 depicts how rural counties compare for the characteristics that are 
considered in the analysis. The counties eventually experiencing FDI are relatively more 
urbanized. They have higher populations, lower unemployment rates, and lower poverty 
rates. Additionally, these counties contain a higher count of establishments and of those 
establishments, a higher share of manufacturing establishments. It is also evident that 
these counties may be economically linked to more urban areas. This is revealed through 
a higher percentage of commuters. Demographically, treatment counties have larger 
Black and Asian populations.  In comparing the means of treated and control counties it 
is evident that treatment counties are inherently different from control counties. 
Furthermore, it appears that treatment counties were already on different growth 
trajectories. The differences in the means across these groups are statistically significant. 
This validates the need to use propensity score matching in the model. Without such a 
model, the estimates would be biased upwards.   
Table 3.2 depicts how matched pairs compare among the same group of 
characteristics. Once the propensity score matching model is employed, the treatment and 
control counties within propensity score blocks are balanced across the characteristics 
considered. The differences between the means of the treatment and control groups in the 





Section 3.4: Methodology 
 
In order to evaluate the economic effects of FDI in rural communities, I combine 
propensity score matching with a difference-in-difference model to estimate the impact of 
FDI on personal income and employment growth. The difference-in-difference approach 
addresses the issue of unobserved confounders by subtracting the initial mean differences 
in treatment and control groups. By combining this approach with propensity score 
matching to identify the control group, I can be sure that the treatment and control groups 
had similar trends prior to any foreign investment (Pender and Reeder, 2011). This model 
will test the effect of FDI on personal income growth from 2003 to 2018. The regression 
takes the following form: 
 
ln(personal	income#)$ = : + 	;$%&'()*% + <(=>?@$%&'()*)%& + :' + A& + B( +	C%(& 
 
 
The dependent variable is the log of personal income in county i at time t. The 
variable $%&'()* is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a county ever receives FDI 
during the time period of the analysis and is zero otherwise. The coefficient, <, on the 
variable =>?@$%&'()*%& 	is the coefficient of interest. This is the difference in difference 
estimator which is only equal to 1 for counties that have received FDI in time periods 
after the investment occurred. :' are matched-pair fixed effects and A& and B( represent 
time and state fixed effects respectively. I also use this model to test the effect of FDI on 





Section 3.5: Results from the Difference-In-Difference Estimation 
 
Table 3.3 details the logit estimation results from the propensity score matching 
model.  All variables included in the model have the expected signs and most are 
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level or higher. While I only consider 
the determinants of foreign investment in rural counties, it is likely that less rural 
counties, or counties that are economically linked to more urbanized areas, will be more 
likely to attract foreign investment projects. For these reasons, measures relating to 
population size and a higher percentage of workers that are commuting to nearby 
counties should increase the probability of investment. Rural areas with higher poverty 
and unemployment rates most likely offer worse business services, infrastructure, and 
lower education levels. As expected, these factors all negatively affect the probability of 
investment. Measures capturing industrial agglomeration, such as the total count of 
establishments should be positive factors in the location decision. As most of the 
investment projects locating in rural areas are within manufacturing, the share of 
manufacturing establishments in an area should increase the probability of investment.  
The estimated probability of receiving FDI for each county is calculated from the 
logit coefficients. Next, each treated rural county is matched to a control county with the 
nearest propensity score. These county matches are then used in the difference-in-
difference analysis.  
The results from the difference-in-difference approach are presented in Table 3.4. 
The analysis reveals that rural areas do not seem to significantly benefit from FDI. Under 
both the per capita personal income and the employment specifications, the coefficient on 
the treatment variable is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that rural 
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counties receiving foreign direct investment projects experience faster personal income 
and employment growth than rural counties without such projects. Nevertheless, based on 
the results obtained from the analysis, it is not evident that this growth can be directly 
attributed to FDI. The coefficient on the difference-in-difference estimator is close to 
zero in both specifications. FDI has no additional impact on these regions after the 
investments occurred. These findings are in line with previous research that finds a need 
for areas to have absorptive capacity in order to benefit from FDI. In order for an area to 
be able to benefit from FDI, it needs to have a certain threshold of human capital and 
financial market development to experience compounding growth effects (Carbonell and 
Werner, 2018). While FDI appears to be going to more developed rural areas with better 
economic linkages, these areas may not be developed enough to benefit fully from the 
investment. It is more likely that urban areas with higher industry agglomeration would 
see larger gains from FDI. The next section explores this conjecture in further detail 
through a case study analysis on Troup County, Georgia. 
 
Section 3.6: Case Study: The Kia Effect 
 
In 2006, Troup County, Georgia experienced one of the largest foreign direct 
investments of any rural area when Kia Motors decided to establish its operations in the 
county. This investment included a one-billion-dollar assembly plant which would 
provide approximately 2,500 jobs. In addition, Kia also expected several suppliers to 
establish their operations in the area in the following years. These subsequent projects 
represented an additional 3,600 jobs and an additional 830 million-dollar investment in 
the region. From a site selection perspective, this move was unexpected. Troup County 
did not have the necessary infrastructure and supply chain linkages, as evidenced by the 
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deal requirements, that other areas could offer. The only benefit of the area was that it 
was located near a major highway and in close proximity to the Hyundai plant in 
Montgomery, Alabama. Regarding state and local incentives, the automaker requested 
site preparation assistance, workforce training, tax incentives, and proof that the plant 
would be welcomed by the local community. Georgia spent 48.5 million dollars on site 
preparation, 81 million dollars on road improvements, and also built a 14.5 million-dollar 
training facility which would be managed by the QuickStart program. In addition to these 
incentives, Troup County also offered the automaker 130 million dollars in property tax 
abatements which would gradually dissipate over a 16-year period as well as an 
additional 21 million dollars towards infrastructure development. Over time, the Kia 
suppliers established their operations, and several other major suppliers also located in 
the area. These include Hyundai-Mobis, Dongwon Autopart Technology, Sejong Georgia 
LLC, Sewon America, Daehan Solution, Johnson Controls, Glovis, Powertech America 
and Kumho Tire. Locals were excited about the new plant and expected a housing boom 
and a revitalization of the area with new families locating in close proximity to the auto 
plant. While a few new businesses have since emerged, the “boom” has been smaller than 
expected and county unemployment remains high. As with all large business deals, there 
are also some concerns regarding the tax concessions and whether the economic benefits 
of the investment outweigh the costs (Maister, 2011).   
In this part of the analysis, I aim to shed some light on the impact of the Kia 
investment. In order to do this, I use the propensity score obtained in the first stage of the 
analysis in order to identify the best match for Troup County. This match is then used to 
identify the impact of the investment on personal income and employment growth. Based 
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on the propensity score matching model outlined in Section 3.4, I determined that the best 
matches for Troup County are St. Joseph County, Michigan and St. Landry Parish, 
Louisiana. 
Before turning to the results of the analysis, it is important to understand how 
Troup differs from other counties and how it compares with its closest matches. Table 3.5 
details the characteristics on which the matches were made. Relative to all other rural 
counties that received FDI during the period of the study, Troup county has a slightly 
higher population. Moreover, the population is also relatively younger. Firms benefit 
from having access to large young population. Other attractions of this county include a 
lower unemployment rate, a higher share of manufacturing establishments as well as a 
higher total count of establishments. It is also interesting to note that the percentage of 
commuters is much lower than in other rural counties. This indicates that Troup County 
is not as economically integrated with more urbanized areas as are other rural counties. 
Based on the estimated propensity scores, St. Joseph County, Michigan is the closest 
match for Troup County, Georgia. Relative to St. Joseph County, Troup had a higher 
poverty rate and a lower share of manufacturing establishments. Additionally, the 
percentage of commuters was much lower, indicating that Troup was not as economically 
integrated to urbanized areas as it’s match. 
Estimating the local impact of a policy or event is often done using a series of 
shift-share analyses (Feser, 2013). In a shift-share approach, the level of the economic 
activity of interest before the treatment is subtracted from the level of the economic 
activity of interest after the treatment. The economic activity of interest before the 
treatment is adjusted by a nationally representative “share” of the growth rate of the 
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economic activity of interest. Following Isserman and Merrifield (1982), rather than 
using the “national share” of the growth rate, the growth rate of the control group is used. 
Under this model, the total impact, I, of the Kia investment in Troup County at time t, 
takes the following form:  
 
*%	& = $%	& − '*	+&$%	+	 
 
Where !!	# represents income or employment in Troup County at time t. Similarly, 
$%	+	represents the income or employment in Troup County in year 0 (2005), the year in 
which the investment occurred. The variable '*	+& represents the growth rate in each of the 
economic activities of interest in the control counties from year 0 to year t. I perform this 
analysis from 2006-2018. The results from the impact analysis are detailed in Tables 3.6 
and 3.7. 
In this shift-share analysis, I consider four different measures of economic 
growth. These are per capita personal income, nonfarm personal income, total 
employment, and nonfarm employment. The analysis reveals that Troup County does not 
experience per-capita personal income growth following the Kia investment. While St. 
Joseph County did not receive any foreign investment during this time, it still 
experienced a faster per capita personal income growth rate. This could be due to the 
more industrialized nature of the county. As previously noted, St. Joseph has a higher 
share of commuters and a higher share of manufacturing activity. These characteristics 
may have allowed the county to experience stronger personal income growth over time.  
In all other measures examined, Troup County outpaces St. Joseph county in the years 
following the Kia Investment. The same analysis is repeated with the next closest county 
match, St. Landry Parish, Louisiana. Similar trends are obtained from this analysis. Troup 
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County experiences negative growth in per capita personal income from 2006-2018. In 
this specification, Troup County also experiences negative growth from 2006-2010 in 
nonfarm personal income, total employment, and nonfarm employment, which could be 
attributed to the recession during these years. It could also be argued that it takes time to 
see the effects of an investment as large as the Kia plant. While the investment occurred 
in 2006, the first car was not produced 2009. It is plausible that the county would not reap 
the full benefits of the investment until 2011 or later as the results indicate. Troup County 
begins experiencing growth in 2011 across nonfarm personal income, total employment, 
and nonfarm employment; however, the growth experienced is not as significant as the 
growth estimates obtained when using St. Joseph county as the control county. These 
results are given in Table 3.7.  
The next section takes this analysis one step further by assessing the economic 
impact of the Kia investment using an input-output impact model (IMPLAN). 
Additionally, it estimates the hypothetical impact of the investment in St. Joseph County, 
a county with much stronger agglomeration networks. Based on the literature and the 
findings so far, it is anticipated that the effects would be stronger in such a community. 
 
Section 3.7: Impact Analysis using IMPLAN 
 
The final part of the analysis applies an input-output model using IMPLAN 
software to estimate the impact of the Kia investment on the local community. This inter-
industry model has the advantage of providing a level of detail in the economic impact 
study which would otherwise not be possible to ascertain with other models. The 
software accounts for the inter-industry relationships within the local economy in great 
depth and the transactions among industries. The model takes into account 536 sectors, 
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using roughly 100 datasets. It accounts for non-disclosed industries and non-census 
survey years, to capture all market transactions in a given period. The model allows me to 
evaluate the total effect of the Kia investment based on the direct spending and 
employment emanating from the plant. I can then calculate the indirect effects, or the 
effects that can be attributed to industry purchases of inputs from other local industries. 
These are the intermediate expenditures of the industry being analyzed. Non-local 
purchases of intermediate inputs are also built into the model, but these are not 
considered as part of the county-level impacts.  
Table 3.8 displays the results from the IMPLAN analysis. The model estimates 
that the Kia plant created 3,000 direct jobs in Troup County. Additionally, the plant 
supports an estimated 1,710 indirect jobs through its supplier network. Together, this 
represents a total of 4,710 jobs in the county tied to the Kia investment. The resulting 
Kia-related county employment multiplier is 1.57. This means that for every one job 
created at the Kia plant, approximately 0.6 additional jobs are supported through Troup 
county supplier relationships.  
Beyond employment impacts, I examine the plant’s gross (total) output and value 
added. The total output effect represents the annual value of Kia’s operations. The total 
output of the Kia plant is approximately 3.65 billion dollars. It includes employee wages 
and benefits, equipment, building construction and overhead, technology services, 
spending on vendors, and other administrative costs at the county level. Kia’s operations 
boost the demand for goods and services from other suppliers and businesses that are 
linked to their supply chain. To satisfy this increase in demand, these suppliers and 
vendors must also source additional materials which also contributes to Kia’s overall 
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multiplier effect. These additional purchases could even affect sectors outside of the 
automotive industry. These additional purchases that are a result of Kia’s increased 
demand, are the indirect effects from Kia’s operations. Kia’s estimated indirect output 
effect is 410 million dollars.   
While the total output of the plant is valued at 3.65 billion dollars, the value added 
captured by the county is just 662,853,127. This means that most of what is assembled in 
the automotive plant draws on components and supplies from outside the county. The 
county’s local content–the ratio of total output to value-added–is relatively low; 
approximately 20 percent.  
In order to get a better understanding of the potential impacts of such a large 
investment, the employment impact is compared with St. Joseph County, Michigan, 
which had a larger population and lower poverty and unemployment rates in the year 
2000. Table 3.9 displays the results for the economic impact that they Kia plant may have 
had if they had chosen to locate in St. Joseph County, Michigan. The results from the 
analysis are similar to those from Troup County. St. Joseph County Michigan does not 
have an automotive manufacturing assembly sector. Given a smaller local supplier base, 
the estimated indirect impacts are slightly smaller than the ones estimated for Troup 
County.  For a plant that directly employs 3,000 workers in St. Joseph County, an 
additional 1,198 jobs would be created through local suppliers. This compares with 1,710 
jobs supported through the local supply chain in Troup County.  
In general, the impact of a large FDI project in a rural area is small relative to 
what it could be if a similar size plant would have located in a well-developed urban area. 
There is a relatively low multiplier effect and low value-added relative to the total output. 
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As a result of the Kia investment, Troup County does have a more developed supplier 
network than a county like St. Joseph. Even so, the indirect impact and the multiplier 
effects are small. Rural counties may not have the absorptive capacity necessary to take 
advantage of the gains from FDI. These effects are even smaller in a county with a less 
developed automotive sector. For the Kia investment, most of the impact of the 
investment is outside of the local area.  
 
Section 3.8: Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the consequences of FDI in rural counties in the United 
States. While rural counties have received much larger investments than urban counties, 
there is at best minimal evidence that these investments have aided in increasing 
economic development outcomes as captured by personal income and employment 
growth. In the first stage of the analysis I combine propensity score matching with a 
difference-in-difference approach to test the effect of FDI on personal income and 
employment growth. Rural counties with FDI projects are matched to rural counties that 
received no such investments based on characteristics that are deemed to influence both 
the probability of investment and personal income and employment growth. This analysis 
reveals that counties with FDI are experiencing faster personal income and employment 
growth, however, this effect is not directly attributed to the investments received.  
These findings are in line with previous literature showing that areas must have 
absorptive capacity in order to benefit from FDI. As rural areas are less developed, they 
do not have the necessary linkages to take advantage of the gains from FDI. To further 
explore this claim, I examine the impact of a large investment in a rural county. In the 
second part of the paper, I examine the case of Troup County, Georgia which landed the 
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Kia investment in 2006. I compare the impact of the investment in Troup County to its 
closest matches using a quasi-experimental approach. This quasi-experimental approach 
demonstrates that Troup did not experience personal income growth following the Kia 
investment. In fact, the closest matches actually experienced faster personal income 
growth rates during this time. However, there is some evidence that Troup County 
experienced faster employment growth than both of its matches over the time period of 
the analysis. In the final part of the paper, I use an input-output model (IMPLAN 
software) to determine the impact of the Kia investment on Troup County. For 
comparison purposes, I also test the hypothetical impact of the investment in St. Joseph 
County. I find small multiplier and value-added effects of the Kia plant in Troup County 
and comparable but smaller effects for St. Joseph County, Michigan. 
While FDI is frequently targeted for its perceived economic benefits, this paper 
finds minimal evidence that the impacts are substantial. It is possible that local and state 
governments would be advised to strengthen their existing supplier bases in addition to 
attracting new businesses as a development strategy. Future work should examine the 






























 Table 3.2: Matched Pair Descriptive Statistics, 2000 
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Table 3.3: Logit Results: Propensity Score Matching 












    Table 3.4: Results from the Difference-in-Difference Analysis 












        Table 3.5: Case Study County Characteristics, 2000 




Table 3.6: Impact Analysis using St. Joseph County as the Match 
   
 
 
 Table 3.7: Impact Analysis using St. Landry Parish as the Match 
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                       Figure A.2: Density of the Forcing Variable 
 
Note: This figure examines the density of the forcing 
variable, distance to the border in kilometers from 
cities in the analysis. This figure serves to establish 
that investors are not sorting into the former empire 
territory. To verify that this is the case, there should 
be no evidence of a discontinuity in the number of 
cities at the border. While there are more cities in the 
non-empire territory, this figure presents evidence that 
there is no discontinuity in the number of cities at the 
former empire border, which occurs at a distance of 0. 
